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Mac Thompson 1 
21-22 January, 2007 – Bangkok, Thailand 2 
Interviewer, Editor – Paul Hillmer 3 
Transcriber – Diane Schuessler 4 
 5 
Paul Hillmer and Mac Thompson in the lobby of the Ambassador Hotel, Bangkok, January 2007. 6 
 7 
Editor’s note:  If you knew Mac Thompson you know he was not fond of siting in a quiet 8 
place and talking.  Better to be in a bar sipping a Singha.  While the audio is reasonably 9 
clear despite this handicap, a few phrases got lost. Anything highlighted in yellow is unclear 10 
and is spelled phonetically (if possible) based on the transcriber/editor’s best guess. 11 
 12 
(0:21)  We'll start with the obvious.  Your name, sir. 13 
[Chuckles]  MacAlan Thompson or more commonly known as Mac. 14 
 15 
(0:28) And where were you born? 16 
Eleven June, 1941.  Just made it as a prewar baby. 17 
All right.  Where did you grow up and go to school, that sort of stuff? 18 
Well, grew up—born in Portland, Oregon and grew up in all that immediate area.  High school at 19 
Lake Oswego just outside of Portland and the first two years, '59 to '61, off to college in Colorado—20 
Colorado School of Mines. 21 
School of Mines. 22 
Correct. 23 
OK. 24 
Which is in Golden, Colorado, which, coincidentally, is where the Coors Brewery is. 25 
Right.  I've been there. 26 
Which contributed to my only staying two years at that school, I think, that … 27 
[Laughs]  OK. 28 
Transferred back to Oregon State University then, the fall of '61 and in '63 graduated in forest 29 
engineering. 30 
 31 
(1:12) OK.  So, how did you get from there to signing up for IVS and going overseas? 32 
Well, ROTC at Oregon State—the fall of '63, November of '63, off to the army.  Three months 33 
engineer offered basic course in Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  And I was assigned to—oh, Fort Devens, 34 
Massachusetts for my two years.  While we were at Fort Belvior the—somebody from personnel 35 
came down in the Pentagon and said, ‘Hey, you're all second lieutenants.  You all have the same 36 
MOS [Military Occupational Speciality]—1331.  You're combat engineer platoon leader.  So you're 37 
basically interchangeable.  If you find somebody you want to swap with, swap—let us know before 38 
the deadline’, whatever that was.  So I put my notice on the board—I'm not interested in Fort 39 
Devens.  Anybody want to swap?  One guy didn't want to go to Germany, but that was an extra 40 
year—a three-year commitment.  I said, ‘No.’  Another guy didn't want to go to Korea, but –ooh! 41 
Wintertime—that didn't sound good.  And the day before the deadline a guy comes running up and 42 
says, ‘Hey, hey, Thompson, I've been looking for you.  Well, I want to swap.’  ‘Well, where are you 43 
going?’  And he says, ‘Well, I'm from Fort—50 miles from Fort Devens and my wife is seven 44 
months pregnant.  And swap, swap, please.’  ‘Well, where are you going?’  Well, he's going to Korat, 45 
Thailand.  I knew where Thailand was, so, ‘Well, OK, given the deadline, what the hell?  I'll go to 46 
Thailand.’  That was February 1964, showed up here in Thailand.  And I'm—here I still am.  47 
[Chuckles] You know, one year up at Korat and February of '65 off to Dugway Proving Grounds, 48 
Utah, until I got out of the army in November of '65.  And then just wandering around job hunting 49 
back in Portland, not doing very much and just had run across a 3x5 card on a—where was it?  50 
Down at the Southern Oregon College of Education.  I was just traveling through there and paying 51 
for breakfast at the cafeteria.  I just wrote down—you know, it said International Voluntary Services, 52 
positions in Vietnam and Laos and found that note a few weeks later.  And I had lots of job 53 
applications out and sent one off to them.  And on towards April '66—this would have been 54 
December of '65.  Along towards April of '66, got two phone calls the same Friday—one from 55 
Bureau of Land Management in Fairbanks.  I had already been rejected for smoke jumping up there 56 
for that summer.  And they said, ‘Hey, you know, we've had some no-shows.  Can you show up on 57 
Monday?’  But just before that, I'd got a phone call from the IVS traveling interviewer and said, 58 
‘Hey, coming through Portland Airport.  Could I come out in the airport and we'll talk?’  I said, 59 
‘OK.  Well, I'll call you guys back on Saturday.’  So, talked to the IVS guy and said, ‘Hey, it doesn't 60 
pay very much, but it sounds interesting.’  And so, he said, ‘Well, it looks like a lock.’  Called the 61 
BLM and said, ‘Oh, I won't go there.’  Then June '66, off to Washington D.C. for orientation.  And 62 
we had—our group had seven weeks of Lao language training at Foreign Service Institute in 63 
Arlington.  And then, in September of '66, you know, we went to Laos.  But right after the flood.  64 
The water—the flood waters had gone down, but not enough to open the airport.  So, we went in 65 
by helicopter from Udorn into That Luang there in Vientiane. 66 
 67 
(4:48) I'm going to check this for just a second.  My guess is that we're OK. 68 
 69 
[Interviewer turns off recorder to check microphone, new track begins] 70 
 71 
(0:00) OK.  So, you hit the ground where here? 72 
[Confused] 73 
I'm sorry, in Laos? 74 
In Laos, it was September '66 right after the flood, and I was in Vientiane for about a week.  And 75 
oh, the—parts of the runway at Wattay Airport, you know, the subsurface dried out enough so they 76 
had little airplanes flying in and out.  So at that time, we had two people—myself and another guy—77 
John Vantine who were going to be assigned up in Hongsa.  So we got on the Dornier airplane—78 
little twin engine STOL [short take-off and landing] airplane made in Germany that was flown by 79 
Continental Air Services, Inc.  And we flew up to Hongsa.  And—which is in Sayabouri Province. 80 
 81 
(0:43) So what was your job description? 82 
Well, that was—at that time, USAID had a program that was a cooperative with IVS, called the 83 
Forward Area Team Program—USAID funded.  Well, the whole USAID—or IVS program in Laos 84 
was on USAID contracts.  But anyway, this Forward Area Program was kind of designed as—to 85 
impact rural development in areas that had been, oh, either semi-insecure or who had been—which 86 
had been kind of retaken from all the bad guys recently—well, recently being one or two years 87 
sometimes.  And just kind of to show the flag—show the Lao government flag that, you know, 88 
schools and dispensaries and, oh, cement and other  visible aid can flow from the good guys—the 89 
Royal Lao government.  [Chuckles]  So there—that was—well, Hongsa—the two of us.  And we 90 
also had two Lao guys, interpreter-field associate type thing. 91 
 92 
(1:52) OK, so, I'm sorry.  I’m distracted by bugs here—so if you would, just describe the 93 
work that you did there and how successful it was. 94 
Well, it's hard to say how successful.  [Chuckles]  You know, I was there—only there up until about 95 
January of '67.  IVS stayed in, you know, with different people, stayed in the valley there up until at 96 
least 1971, I think, '71 or '72.  In fact, one of the guys who was there—Jim Archer, a Canadian, he's 97 
been back in Laos for eight or nine years, working out east of Savannakhet for a Canadian 98 
development agency.  And I've e-mailed with him fairly often and kind of rarely, with a couple of the 99 
other people that have been in Hongsa.  And there—Hongsa was mostly an ethnic Lao valley—or 100 
the valley parts of it were.  There were some Hmong that came through—more Yao, it seemed in 101 
the hillsides and—that were down in the markets, you'd see now and then.  A very isolated valley.  102 
Now you can drive to it.  But, in fact, Tony Zola, a couple years ago drove from Hongsa Valley 103 
down to Sayabouri town.  He was up there on a—I think, on a World Bank sponsored trip in a four-104 
wheel drive pickup.  But that is accessible to the Mekong River by road and the Mekong then 105 
from—either from Thailand, Chiang Khong, Houei Sai or Luang Prabang.  But after Hongsa, a guy 106 
named—was transferred up to Nam Bac, Lima Site 203, up north of Luang Prabang.  And that was 107 
a relatively hot area.  Then, taken back—let's see, in spring of '66, it was taken back from Pathet Lao 108 
forces.  And there was an IVS guy up there named [Kyde Levitt] and he was finishing his two years.  109 
And so I was assigned up there then to replace him.  And got up there and should be, oh, probably 110 
mid-February, late February 1967.  And we were there just a few weeks.  We had a tent there, lived 111 
in a tent, which was maybe 100 yards from the local Lao army camp.  And had a pretty good 112 
shootout one evening and so I and my field assistant, we walked over to—scrambled over to the 113 
army camp and stayed there through the night and then through parts of the morning.  And there 114 
was still sporadic shooting going on, so no evac airplane came in until—what, late afternoon, mid 115 
afternoon.  You know, I had my radio—ground air radio talking to the pilots.  And the mid 116 
afternoon, got a H-34 come in on the west end of the runway because it was all quiet down there 117 
and picked up the wounded—you know, a couple trips of wounded and a little bit of re-supply, and 118 
then myself and the field assistant went out.  And after that, normally I did not spend the night at 119 
Nam Bac.  USAID didn't want me to and the IVS didn't want me to, so I lived, for the most part, 120 
down at Luang Prabang and commuted back and forth in the daytime.  And… 121 
 122 
(5:10) Well, let me back you up to this exchange you made with this desperate fellow who 123 
wanted to be near his pregnant wife. 124 
Oh, back at … 125 
How much did you know about the situation in Laos when you made this change and 126 
suddenly found yourself heading in a direction you hadn't anticipated? 127 
[Pauses]  The situation in Laos—virtually nothing.  Oh, I had read in, you know, Time and Newsweek, 128 
back when I was in college, you know, the Kennedy era when he sent the Marines into—oh, 129 
Udorn—the helicopters and I forget—Larry Fraser, the guy you met yesterday—if he was part of 130 
that early Marine group or not, but … 131 
No. 132 
OK. 133 
Well, you know, we didn't talk as much about Vietnam as we did about Laos, so I'll just say 134 
… 135 
Well, it wasn't Vietnam.  They went into Udorn in Thailand. 136 
OK. 137 
And … 138 
He didn't mention it. 139 
… I forget what month it was in 1962, where a Marine helicopter wing or a couple of wings went in 140 
and that's actually when the U.S. military buildup kind of started in Thailand.  The U.S. Army 141 
buildup, not Air Force.  And they—oh, that was played at a bit in the newspapers.  But you know, in 142 
Time and Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report.  So, I knew about Thailand, but not very much.  143 
And I knew, essentially, zero about Laos.  And then, when got up to Korat in Thailand—this was—144 
we got there in February of '64 to February of '65—heard again very little about Laos because we 145 
didn't get much in the way of newspaper up there at that time and there was no U.S. TV as it came 146 
in later to the U.S. forces up there.  About the weekend I arrived, there was a coup d'etat in Laos 147 
and we were all on alert.  And then the weekend before I left, there was another semi-coup d'etat in 148 
Laos and we were on—restricted to base and loading up our trucks, you know, getting ready to 149 
evacuate American civilians, if need be, from Vientiane, which didn't come off.  Everything quieted 150 
down in Laos.  But that was about all I knew about Laos. 151 
 152 
(7:22) So, what was your sort of learning process as you got into first one village and then 153 
another about the status of things in Laos, about the role of ethnic minorities in the 154 
campaign and things of that nature? 155 
Well, again, up country in places like Xieng Lom, prior to Hongsa, where I first was the first five 156 
months, there was no news except what you might be able to pick up on your own personal little 157 
shortwave radio, maybe VOA or a station like that—BBC.  We had electricity, say, 15 minutes to 30 158 
minutes a day.  You know, a radio check to crank up our little three KW generator in the morning in 159 
the morning and in the afternoon, 5:00, make radio check with Luang Prabang.  You know, just said, 160 
‘Hey, everything's still OK.’  Because the rule was if you missed two radio checks, they were 161 
supposed to send an airplane out to see if there was a problem—if you were wandering around in 162 
the bush or not.  So, we had no news except now and then an airplane would come by and, you 163 
know, a couple of the pilots were nice.  They'd say, ‘Hey, there's some activity’…  We were just 164 
talking to them on the radio, they might not land.  But, ‘Hey, there's some activity to the east of you 165 
guys.  Sleep gently the next night or two.’  So, on the geopolitics side, absolutely nothing.  You 166 
know, living in the Lao Valley, we saw a few of the highlanders, but had no interaction with them.  167 
The only things I did with the Yao there—I used to buy—get some brass from 105 Howitzer shells 168 
from Muong Soui, one of our other guys who worked over there.  And they'd pound them into 169 
bracelets and then take the bracelets and they'd sell them to Americans down in Vientiane and then 170 
take the money back [Chuckles] to the villagers and, you know, a little producing some income, cash 171 
income.  And—but there's no real insight into the war.  What I got into later at Xieng Lom and 172 
other places, I found on my little shortwave radio, just again a personal GE portable shortwave, you 173 
know, the frequencies that were used—a couple of them were used by the airplanes, the Air America 174 
and Continental airplanes for the various odds and ends of position reports, and if you had your 175 
map and you listened long enough and you got down to Vientiane every now and then, you could—176 
and you had the site book, the Air America field—published field—the air field site index for Laos, 177 
you could kind of follow the war from what was going on, just from a lot of the radio chatter.  And 178 
you got so you could recognize voices oft times.  And …  [Chuckles] 179 
 180 
(10:14) So, to what extent did you rely on Air America or Continental Air or, you know, other 181 
services to get your work done? 182 
Well, to get to work.  We—they were used to get in and out of places.  If we were staying for an 183 
extended period of time, they brought replacement food up from the commissary because often 184 
there was not very much available locally to buy or not very much I really wanted to eat.  And in a 185 
couple of the places I worked, like Nam Bac, there was only either—well, primarily Air America at 186 
that time, you know, air available to get cement roofing sheets or whatever else I needed up to Nam 187 
Bac itself because the river—the Nam Ou River was closed, you know, by the bad guys.  And 188 
Hongsa, for—at that time, the river was often open so we could get cement down from the Thai 189 
border at Chiang Khong, Ban Houei Sai by riverboat, and then hauled over the ridgeline by, you 190 
know, elephants.  And I guess that was one of the early contracts was elephant hauling contracts… 191 
 192 
[Mr. Thompson’s cell phone goes off.  Recorder turned off, new track begins.]  193 
 194 
(0:00) Coming through loud and clear. 195 
All right.  No, they, well, just brief background.  I was in Vientiane.  I moved from Ban Houei Sai 196 
down to Vientiane in June of 1970.  And until June of '75 I was based in Vientiane.  And I spent 197 
99% of my time in Vientiane.  You know, with some trips up country, oh, several trips up to Long 198 
Tieng and up country from there just checking on security things for our C-46 program.  But I did 199 
the organizing for the logistics part of it and the gross drop schedule each month for that period.  200 
And they—come, oh, April '75—that would have been mid-April—myself and two other guys—201 
three other—two Lao and one other USAID guy—we went to Manila for a food storage 202 
conference, mostly for an appeal for aid, you know, U.S. donated food overseas, which we had quite 203 
a bit of in Vientiane.  And while we were there in, again, mid April '75, Phnom Penh went down the 204 
tubes.  And that was April 17, I think, when it went down.  And at that same time, the evacuation of 205 
Saigon had started, kind of a—not a panic evacuation as yet, but people would be showing up at—in 206 
the evening at the Seafront restaurant, kind of a U.S. mission restaurant bar complex on, oh, on the 207 
main drag.  And you know, ‘What are you doing here?’  ‘Well, you know, we're from Vientiane.’  208 
‘Well, we just got evacuated from Saigon.’  ‘Oh, OK, well, interesting.’  And then, myself and the 209 
other three people, we flew back to Vientiane.  And then April 29, 30, Saigon went down the tubes.  210 
And I'm sometimes kind of a thinking guy.  So, I think it was the next weekend, my Volkswagen 211 
camper—I had a '71 VW camper I had bought secondhand in '73 in Vientiane.  And it needed a 212 
little bit of work done on it, too, and the Volkswagen dealer in Vientiane didn't have much for parts.  213 
The people in Udorn did.  So I loaded everything I owned from my house, except a bit monster 214 
stereo cabinet that might have fit on top of the car, but everything except a suitcase to—and the 215 
clothes to live out of and splayed the wheels on the car and drove it down across the river over to 216 
Nong Khai that weekend.  Monday, back in Vientiane and—by taxi, and some of the people in the 217 
office—‘Where's your car?’  ‘Well, I took it down to Udorn for maintenance.’  ‘Oh, you're—chicken 218 
shit.’  [Chuckles]  I said, ‘No, no, I'm not.’  Anyway, oh, see, that was early May—May 10, something 219 
like that.  And I don't remember the exact date, but about May 23, '75, when the leftist students and 220 
not really the PL [Pathet Lao] soldiers, but leftist students and USAID protestors surrounded the 221 
USAID compound in Vientiane, locked it up.  And also the large, you know, the housing compound 222 
out at Kilometer Six, just north of town.  And prior to that Savannakhet had had, you know, 223 
problems and USAID in Savannakhet and USAID in Luang Prabang and USAID Ban Houei Sai, 224 
which I personally wasn't that much aware of.  You know, we'd just hear rumors of it in Vientiane.  I 225 
was very low on the totem pole at that time, you know, within the USAID hierarchy.  But anyway, I 226 
lived outside the compound—outside of the housing compound at KM Six.  Probably, oh, I don't 227 
know, maybe 20%, 30% of our people did, some with families, other bachelors like I was.  And 228 
about—it took about a week before we got back into the compound and the negotiation with the 229 
PL.  But for that last month, my job was going around with a car and a crow bar and bolt cutters, 230 
going to a house and—formerly leased by USAID, busting into it and then loading up the personal 231 
effects of the occupants and getting it out to our packers and then delivered to the airport to be 232 
either flown down to Bangkok or later we started flying things to Udorn.  It was just a closer haul.  233 
And I was going to be staying on.  And day by day, we had people leaving, you know, small numbers 234 
of people.  I forget if we actually chartered the Air Lao or Thai Air International plane or not, but 235 
[there were]  numbers of people, worker people and their families, wives and kids, leaving every day 236 
until mid June we were down to a fairly small number of people.  And my plan was to stay on for 237 
another month, you know, continue working on household effects.  But June 26, '75, I believe it 238 
was, I had gone in—I had taken some cars across the river to Nong Khai already that morning—239 
personal cars.  And came back in to say good-bye to our USAID director Gordon Ramsey and his 240 
secretary Bea Perez, who were leaving, you know, early afternoon on a Thai International flight.  241 
And they said, ‘Hey, you've got to go, too.  We've all be PNG'd.’  You know, persona non grata.  I 242 
said, ‘Well, hey, but I was planning on staying.’  And ‘Well, no you can't.  You've got to be out.’  And 243 
Chris Chapman, the DCM or chargee was there—we didn't have an ambassador at the time.  He had 244 
already transferred down to Bangkok with Charlie Whitehouse.  But they said, ‘No, no.  You've got 245 
to go.’  You know, and I said, ‘Well, I can't.  You know, all my stuff is—I haven't packed a bag.’  246 
And they said, ‘Well, OK.  You can go out on the 4:00 DAO—defense attaché airplane, the C-47.’  I 247 
said, ‘No, I got my car over at Nong Khai.  You know, I'll just go out 5:00, 6:00 tonight.’  ‘No, you 248 
can't do that.  The road's blocked in between here and Thanaleng.’  I said, ‘No, it's not.  I've been 249 
down there twice this morning and I took 17 cars across.’  So it was agreed I would leave, you know, 250 
that—before close of business, roughly.  But the main reason, I had something like 21 cases of 251 
Foster beer [Interviewer laughs] down at my house I had picked up from the Australians.  They 252 
owed me some beer.  And I wanted to get that to get it back.  Anyway, I got out—went over in the 253 
Australian forestry office and got my buddies there and we went down and loaded the beer up and 254 
got that back, got my money back and they delivered me down to Thadeua and took a long tail boat 255 
across the river.  But anyway, so that was sort of my end of official stay in Laos.  That was 26 June.  256 
I think, you know, spent the weekend there in Nong Khai and then drove on down to Bangkok.  257 
And here in Bangkok, we're on the Sukhumvit Soi 11.  Sukhumvit Soi 1 is where our USAID Lao 258 
Bangkok liaison office was that had been in existence since about 1963 or '64, I think, right up and 259 
through, well, through late '75, early '76, there was a, oh, a contract in our office where a lot of the 260 
Thai goods, like rice, you know, and salt and things that we bought in Bangkok and transportation 261 
for shipping up country, meeting and greeting people when they transited Bangkok.  And I reported 262 
in there.  They said, ‘Well, what's up?’  ‘I've been tossed out.  Are we supposed to go back to 263 
Washington?’  They said, ‘No, no.  You stay on here for a month TDY—temporary duty.’  And we 264 
worked out at Quang Tri Port at the big warehouse where the furniture we had evacuated from Laos 265 
was just stacked in long, long piles and rows, all mixed up.  It had not been packed very well.  It was 266 
an evacuation of furniture from Laos.  And you know, we had encouraged people to try to put their 267 
names on things.  But to try to sort it out.  That was about the time—that was July '75, about the 268 
time the refugee program was starting.  And the counselor staff here at Bangkok from the embassy 269 
was working on some of this.  You know, primarily, it was the Vietnamese that were flying out.  270 
Some of them flying out their airplanes out to U Taphao Air Base.  Others—there were a few 271 
Cambodians on the border.  You know, there was no—there was still a Vietnamese refugee program 272 
at that time.  And why does—I guess, I don't know, one of the—some of the embassy people heard 273 
that I was down here.  And they asked if I would go back up to Udorn and help crank up a program 274 
there.  You know, do some interviews.  So, ‘Well, fine.’  You know, June—no, August 5, I drove 275 
back up to Udorn, '75, and checked in with the consul up there.  And that was sort of the start of 276 
my time in Thailand on that program, detailed to state from USAID. 277 
 278 
(9:08) Now, as I understand it.  This is—when I was talking to Lionel Rosenblatt, there was 279 
you, there was Jerry Daniels and there was John Tucker? 280 
John Tucker came a bit later.  Jerry was there living out what they call the JLD—joint liaison 281 
detachment, which is also called AB1—administrative building one, when we're out at the air base, 282 
which is the CIA office building.  Kind of a bunkhouse upstairs and their offices downstairs. 283 
Taj Mahal. 284 
Right—well, not quite.  But anyway … 285 
As it's referred to. 286 
Yeah.  Right next to the, oh, Air America ramp and the Continental hangars—Continental or CASI 287 
hangars.  And I didn't know Jerry at that time.  I had not met him in Laos.  When I worked out of 288 
Sam Thong, I think he was off and back in Missoula getting a degree, '69.  But anyway, I saw him a 289 
couple times, but the first thing there in Udorn was cranking up or interviews of the Thai Dam 290 
refugees, maybe 600 of them or so that were up in [Wat Nun Pranau] in Nong Khai that we got 291 
there for Thai Dam, you know, the older people from North Vietnam into Laos and actually some 292 
into Thailand, too.  And the—some Tai Nung, another ethnic group from North Vietnam.  And we 293 
got those people processed out under the Vietnamese quotas.  And they all had to be in the U.S. by 294 
30 September 1975, the end of the fiscal year.  And that's what I was talking with Jerry about—you 295 
know, the Hmong are here.  Well, and there were lots of Lao, too.  There were Lao up in Nong 296 
Khai and Lao—there were no camps, really, at that time.  You know, quite a few Lao in Udorn.  Lao 297 
Air Force people in Udorn.  Some—a few had even flown their planes out.  Yeah, one of them lives 298 
in Portland.  I had to go down to the governor's office and sign a receipt for the guy to get him out 299 
of jail.  But I wish I had kept a copy of that.  [Interviewer laughs] But it would be good to show his 300 
grandkids.  [Takes a sip of beer]  Sipping a Singha here at the moment. 301 
Yes, absolutely. 302 
Anyway, the [Pauses] at Nong Khai, I had seen the Hmong encampment area, which is off on the 303 
north side of the road in what they call the [Sogo Toa].  It was the old border police detention 304 
center, primarily, I think, earlier for Vietnamese.  And at that time, UNHCR did not exist at the 305 
Nong Khai - Udorn area, so there was no support for any of the people who were in camp.  One of 306 
the Thai Chinese guys in Nong Khai, a guy named [Kim Gai], who had, over the many years, had 307 
many, many USAID contracts and transportation contracts in Thailand with the U.S. military, he 308 
started providing, you know, some water and things of this sort, I think, out of his own pocket.  I 309 
don't know if he ever got reimbursed for it or not.  But anyway, the—we had an INS guy, the 310 
district director from Hong Kong, Sam Feldman, came in from Thailand and he came up to Udorn 311 
and he did the processing on the Thai Da, you know, approving for U.S. immigration.  Now we 312 
also, of course, at that time, we were talking about all the other groups that were in Udorn and also 313 
other camp—other places in Thailand, in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces primarily.  And you 314 
know—and I was not—well, I was here and, again, low on the totem pole.  I don't know what the 315 
politics were back in the U.S., but my understanding in talking with Lionel is that decisions had been 316 
made that the Hmong—the Meo—were not eligible for U.S. resettlement, no real need to send them 317 
to the U.S.  And that was sort of blanket for all hill tribes.  Sam was on the phone every now and 318 
then, through his headquarters, central office.  What mainly sticks in mind is Saul Eisenstein, who 319 
was not the director of INS.  The director’s name escapes me.  It was a retired Marine general of one 320 
grade.  But anyway, Sam decided he wanted to see what a Hmong is.  So Jerry set this up and the 321 
Hmong were encamped at that time down at Namphong.  And so Jerry spent quite a bit of time 322 
down at Namphong.  He went down there and must admit it was a bit of a sandbagging, I think, 323 
because I went down with Sam and Tucker may have been there—probably was there by then.  It 324 
would have been September '75, down to Namphong.  And here's a line of Hmong.  And you know, 325 
it starts out kind of with, you know, fanaticize a little bit, talk, you know, with Yang Dao.  And Yang 326 
Dao says, ‘Parlez-vous Français?’  We all said, ‘Duh.  Who's this yo-yo?’  ‘Well,’ they said, ‘Well, he's 327 
the only PhD Hmong we got in the world.’  ‘Oh, well, he doesn't speak English.  Don't need to talk 328 
to him.’  And then there's USAID medic this and then there's major that and captain this and, oh, 329 
nurse this—everybody's speaking, you know, decent English to fantastic English, down the line for 330 
50 or 100 people.  And that—we were back to Udorn that evening and Sam's on the phone at the 331 
consulate calling back to central office saying, ‘I will personally pick 1,200 Hmong for the U.S. 332 
program. 333 
 334 
(14:37) Now, Sam, again is in what position? 335 
He's the INS district director for—out of Hong Kong that included Thailand and Korea and, you 336 
know, not Guam, I think, but at least Southeast Asia.  And that was approved and the central office 337 
and Sam then spent a few days doing it.  At that time, we had, of course, no idea that there would be 338 
any future program going on.  So an extremely restricted family structure.  You know, husband, 339 
wife, kids. 340 
Yeah, which to the Hmong is anathema. 341 
If—you know, no dependent parents, you know, things of this sort.  If you didn't want to go, that 342 
was OK.  And I remember one family—well, at that time, we did telegrams and on bios from—a 343 
brief bio, cabled it into Washington and went to the ACVA, the sort of joint voluntary agency 344 
headquarters and they farmed it out to the six, seven … 345 
And how's ACVA different from [JVA] or … 346 
Oh, no, JVA is a local thing here in Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong.  You know, doing the in-347 
processing, if you will, the out-processing interviews.  And the ACVA—and I forget exactly what it 348 
stands for.  The VA—voluntary agencies.  But kind of an over blanket group with—of the six or 349 
seven.  And they would farm the bios out to the different VOLAGs [Voluntary Agencies] in the U.S.  350 
And then we would get a cable back, you know, OK, Ying Yang Phu has been sponsored to 351 
Minneapolis.  And the first, if I remember correctly, the first—I don't remember the guy's name, but 352 
the first Hmong who got a bio or got a sponsor down at Namphong and we went down there—353 
Namphong or Nong Khai, anyway, because we picked a few from Nong Khai, too.  But down there, 354 
gave them the bio.  They had to sign and agree to go.  And well, one of the guys said, well, that's 355 
OK.  So, you know, ‘How many Hmong are there in Minneapolis?’  ‘Well, zero.’  ‘Oh, who's there?’  356 
‘Well, a lot of Americans.’  ‘Oh, how many of those people speak Hmong?’  And this guy had been a 357 
USAID bulldozer operator.  He didn't speak English.  So … 358 
Is it Leng Vang, perhaps? 359 
Huh? 360 
Leng Vang? 361 
No, no idea what the name is. 362 
OK.  Well, that was the first guy who came to the Twin Cities area. 363 
Well, it may have been, you know, Kansas where this guy went, too. 364 
Oh, OK. 365 
But anyway, so, ‘Well, how many of those American people speak Hmong?’  ‘Zero.’  ‘Oh, well, I'm 366 
not sure if I really want to go.’  Said, ‘Go.  Go.  Get out of here.’  So, anyway, I hope he did OK, but 367 
… 368 
(17:16)  So this was September? 369 
It would have been September of '75.  Yeah. 370 
OK. 371 
So, and unfortunately, I didn't keep a—oh, kind of a daily log.  Starting in 1977, I did.  You know, a 372 
little—it's not enough to—that you feel bad writing three or four lines, but it's enough—it's easy 373 
enough to do.  So, I've got good dates after that.  But I'll, you know, then—regress just like we were 374 
talking earlier about Namphong, you know, and the air evac from Long Cheng, which was, what, 12 375 
to 14 May, 1975.  And I was down to Vientiane then, numbly, happily working away and not—376 
things not all that busy in those days, but didn't know what was going on.  And I don't know how 377 
closely all that was held, you know, what USAID people, country team people probably knew about 378 
it.  But it didn't filter down the pipe very much.  But anyway, talking with Les Strouse, who you'll see 379 
tomorrow, flying one of the C-46s, and his logbook and Al Rich's logbook—Al died.  He was flying 380 
the other 46.  And I—looking at the C-130s and that, you know, the number of trips it made and I 381 
figured that rough—between 3,000 and 3,500 Hmong were flown out of Long Tieng to Namphong 382 
and to Udorn.  They didn't all fly down to Namphong.  They decided to shorten it up somewhat and 383 
fly to Udorn and then a bus or truck from Udorn on down.  And then another roughly, say, 8,000 384 
showed up at Nong Khai and they were trucked down to Namphong. 385 
 386 
(19:07) Now, you know—I realize this isn't something you are intimately involved with, but 387 
I know you're also a man who's studied this pretty intensely.  There were the ones who were 388 
flown out by the CIA because of the list that they asked Vang Pao to put together.  And 389 
then, there are the planes that came in because Aderholt made a phone call and a general 390 
approved and he called pilots and more planes came in. 391 
I don't see that VP could have handwritten a list and, you know, 3,000 people.  Now, especially with 392 
talking to Les, the mob scenes and everything that showed up and if there were 10,000 people—393 
20,000, 15,000 people in the Long Tieng Valley and looking at people getting on airplanes.  And if I 394 
was a captain or a lieutenant or a sergeant who wasn't on the list and I've got my wife and kids there, 395 
I would have tried to scramble on an airplane, too.  And I might well have made it.  You know, I—it 396 
may have been an attempt.  But we had, for the USAID Lao side and we had—they had it for 397 
Vietnam and Cambodia, too, they called the KIP list, which is key indigenous personnel.  You know, 398 
these were the ones who were really priorities.  If things go down the tube, we have to get them out.  399 
Well, they didn't do that in Saigon and in Cambodia, talking to Les and others, you know, so many 400 
people just—he said, ‘Well, it won't be that bad.’  They'd just decline to get on any of the airplanes.  401 
So they missed the evac there.  And in Laos, when I hear the term KIP list, I thought that was 402 
appropriate because that's the Lao currency.  I didn't know it meant key indigenous personnel for 403 
several years. [Interviewer laughs]  And I never saw a list.  I've got a—I've got the last, oh, printout 404 
of the USAID Laos personnel roster for the locals and the TCNs, the third country nationals.  And I 405 
just sent that off to Steve Maxner and company at Texas Tech.  It’s in Oregon now.  It should be 406 
mailed.  My sister will send it off FedEx tomorrow along with a bunch of other stuff.  But the—407 
now, I don't see that there was any—there would have been maybe like for Ly Tou Pao and a bunch 408 
of the—you know, the colonels, the higher ups and all that, but get on the first airplane because 409 
after that it's going to turn into a goat fight. 410 
 411 
(21:33) Well, the—I mean, the story is that Jerry came to Vang Pao and said, ‘You have to 412 
leave.  Who do you want to go?’  And there's a man named Yang Long who was in Long 413 
Tieng at that time.  And he said basically VP put together, I think, a list of 96 officers and 414 
their families. 415 
OK, yeah.  That's not 3,500, but that makes sense.  Yeah, and I—well, I think the last plane out 416 
was—have you read Gayle Morrison's book?  [Sky is Falling] 417 
Yeah, I skimmed through it.  I read it awhile ago, but now I really should go back and sort 418 
of go through it a little more carefully. 419 
Yeah, because I don't—I forget who was on that—the jet ranger.  You know, Jerry, VP and 420 
Glassman [Yang See] might have been on it, too.  Glassman was, you know, Jerry's sort of right-421 
hand man at that time.  There was another Hmong guy in Missoula—Lucky, Yang Lu—that I e-mail 422 
with now and then, but he was sort of our main man at Udorn, because Glassman had left already 423 
with VP.  So, yeah, 90 people, 90 heads of families with their families is not 3,500, but that may—424 
that's a more reasonable number. 425 
Yeah.  Although … 426 
Eminently believable. 427 
Yeah.  Family, by Hmong standards, one never knows.  [Laughs] 428 
Well, all right. 429 
I don't know. 430 
Well, we used to have the problem interviewing in the camps.  You know, says, ‘OK.  Well, great.  431 
You know, line up a family.’  And you know, just checking the family relationships and said, ‘OK.  432 
And he's your brother, right?’  ‘Yeah, he's my brother.’  ‘Same mother, same father?’  ‘Well, no, but 433 
what that's got to do with it?’  And we also had—Lucky had a good way with words—Yang Lu.  434 
We'd bring—he'd bring lists of people over to me, you know, by family, you know, to send bios out 435 
on.  And I'd say, ‘OK, Lucky, here we go.’  You know, Hmong moms are much better than 436 
American moms.’  ‘Well, what do you mean?’  He says, ‘Well, here's baby born in January.  OK.  437 
And here's another baby born in April.  And here's the third baby born in November.’  Hoi Yo, Hoi 438 
Yo. [Hmong for “Oh no!]  OK?’  ‘Well, I'll come back tomorrow.’  So, some people's birthdays as, 439 
you know, under—those current social security records are kind of out of the blue. 440 
 441 
(24:10) Oh, I met a young man who's an artist who's probably all of 28, 30 years old.  He 442 
looks 12.  But he said, yeah, his father's birthday is January 1.  His mother's birthday is 443 
February 2.  His oldest brother's birthday is March 3.  You know, right on down the line. 444 
[Chuckles] No, we—I'll—there was one young couple we interviewed in Nong Khai or Namphong, 445 
wherever.  It might even been Ban Vinai.  But a young couple with their two kids.  Mom was 446 
pregnant again, I think.  And the boy was named Pepsi and the daughter was named Cola.  Well, 447 
you're going to pop another one.  What is that?  Green Spot or—definitely anti-Communist.  You 448 
have to go to the U.S. 449 
 450 
(24:58) Now, you mentioned the visit where this deputy INS guy came in and said we're 451 
going to take 1,200 Hmong. 452 
Well, not deputy.  He was the INS district director from Hong Kong. 453 
Fortunately, we've got the right title on here. 454 
Yeah, Sam Feldman.  Right.  He's dead now, but … 455 
That is separate and distinct from Lionel's visit to Namphong, I assume? 456 
No, no.  This was prior to that.  Lionel—that's when I first met Lionel.  He—and it seems to me it 457 
was November—October or November.  We were interviewing down at Namphong.  And maybe 458 
with INS at that time.  And this scraggly State Department guy with frizzly hair and wearing sandals 459 
shows up [Interviewer laughs] and, ‘I'm Lionel Rosenblatt.’  Well, BFD.  That's great.  You know, let 460 
us get back to work.  And … 461 
 462 
(25:48) So, he didn't come by your invitation.  He just sort of … 463 
No, he … 464 
…happened in. 465 
He does that.  But he's in Phnom Penh now.  But he doesn't tell me when he's coming, usually, 466 
because he knows I'll ask him to bring peanuts or homebrew beer kits or something or other.  But 467 
anyway, he's due back here—due into Bangkok Thursday, I think.  But anyway, that's—you know, 468 
Lionel sort of, what would you say?  Thanks to Lionel, the refugee program kept going.  And he 469 
went back and he was working for Julia Taft, the head of the program at the time.  Said, ‘Hey, we've 470 
got numbers left over from the Vietnamese program.  We've got to save those numbers for—there's 471 
refugees still in Thailand and … [Chuckles] 472 
 473 
(26:36) So probably the same impression that was made on Sam was made on Lionel.  As he 474 
meets all these people who speak English and who have code names and … 475 
Well, Lionel, I think, was a whole hell of a lot more broad-minded than that.  He had previously 476 
worked—he was a consular officer in Bangkok in '69 and he also had, I don't know, three month or 477 
six months TDY up in Udorn at the same period, you know, while the Air Force and the war was 478 
going on.  So, he knew what was going on.  And that's why he wanted to come up country a bit, 479 
having been in Bangkok and to see what's going on up there—this little Udorn office.  And that's 480 
where we got the numbers for the spring of, actually, May, June 1970 program was like 10,742 481 
numbers were reserved from the old quota to use in Thailand.  Well, maybe Thailand—maybe some 482 
of them might have gone to Malaysia and Singapore, too, for Vietnamese, but… 483 
 484 
(27:35) So, Jerry Daniels, obviously, a very important figure in the Hmong community, 485 
probably, other than Bill Lair and Vang Pao himself, a name that gets thrown around a lot. 486 
Right. 487 
What was your working relationship like with him and what do you think people should 488 
know about him? 489 
Oh, well, my working relationship was quite excellent.  You know, just sipping suds in Udorn.  It 490 
turned out we were born, you know, the same day, month and year. 491 
Oh, you're kidding me!  [Laughs] 492 
Yeah.  11 June '41.  So, but, yeah, Jerry had a nice way of talking.  I don't know if it was smoke 493 
jumper or Missoula talking.  One brother is a PhD in physiology, writes for—what—running 494 
magazines and the like.  The other, I think, owns a bar, or at least used to own a bar there in 495 
Missoula.  And I forget which the order—you know, who's younger and who's older.  But anyway, 496 
in Udorn in '75, '76—I left Udorn in the end of May '76, came down to Bangkok and replaced 497 
Lionel.  And then, end of October of '76, left Thailand back to Washington.  And I came back in 498 
August '77 down to Malaysia for a couple months and then to Thailand for two months.  And then 499 
in December of '77 back to Washington.  And then June of '78, Lionel is out here and says, ‘Hey, get 500 
your ass out here.’  He says, ‘Well, hey, I'm in this very good, you know, hard-to-get-into USAID 501 
training program—two-year OJT training program.’  And, you know, ‘It doesn't matter.  Come out 502 
here.’  [But I said] ‘Hey, but it's kind of career destroying, but …’  ‘I don't care.  Get out here.’  He 503 
says, ‘I don't care.  Get out here.  I need some help.’  So, anyway I, with some difficulty, quit the 504 
USAID program and came back out here in June of '78.  And Jerry was here already at the time.  505 
And then, we got more formally organized as the refugee section of the U.S. Embassy and assigned 506 
slots here—permanent slots.  So I ended the temporary duty in November of '78.  And Jerry also 507 
goes into a State Department slot.  I was in a State Department slot.  Tucker was in a state slot.  And 508 
at that time, when we got formally organized, I started writing Jerry's efficiency reports for a few 509 
years.  For two or three years.  Anyway, not on the real form because it was probably classified.  But 510 
I would do like a memo to the record and send it over to his office, and then, oh, they would put it 511 
in the proper format and send it back to the head shed.  And the son of a bitch got promoted to 512 
GS-14 before I did.  [Interviewer laughs] So … 513 
 514 
(30:33)  You should have written your own efficiency reports. 515 
Right.  Well, he was an easy one to write them on.   516 
How so? 517 
Well, this very, very dedicated in his work and his approach to the work.  And the problems, that the 518 
Hmong and other hill tribes came up with in their family relationships, particularly multiple wives, 519 
and recommendations on how do we handle this problem and how to—well, from his personal 520 
relationships with a lot of the Hmong leadership, how to calm things down when people got pissed 521 
off at what we were doing.  And like on the multiple wife thing, our policy was to—well, we had 522 
everybody, since we had so many people wanting to apply for the U.S. program of all ethnic groups, 523 
we had a one-year in camp rule.  If you're a new arrival, we didn't even interview you or JVA did not 524 
even interview you until you'd been in a camp for a year.  And then you'd get into the processing 525 
system.  Then we had—at various times we had a point scale.  You know, we had to have a cut line 526 
and—do we take a samlor driver over a, you know, Lao government official or a Hmong lieutenant 527 
or a Lao Theung sergeant?  How did it work out?  So that became kind of complicated on occasion.  528 
But on the multiple wife thing, we came down with the policy finally that, OK, the head of family, 529 
he would choose, OK, who is his wife that he's going to apply for the U.S. program with?  OK.  530 
And then if he had one or two or three others, we said, ‘OK.’  They had and—they and their 531 
children had to come up with a resettlement solution on their own before we would process the 532 
original head of family, the guy.  And whether that resettlement solution is going to France, going to 533 
the U.S. on their own, remarriage in camp or whatever, you know, if that took one or two or five 534 
years, that was the rule.  Once everybody else got taken care of, then we'd go back to the head man 535 
and he'd get processed.  And you know, I understand on occasion, some may have gotten—536 
rumored to have gotten back together in the U.S., but that's life. 537 
I imagine that's true. 538 
My last year in the Army or nine months in the Army was in Utah, so I understand that somewhat, 539 
but … [Interviewer laughs] 540 
 541 
(33:11) So what were some of the other things that the Hmong may have been a little less 542 
than happy about? 543 
Well, one thing that was not so much surprising to me, but it was opium addiction.  It was my 544 
experience in Laos, my four years up country in Laos, is that I ran into extremely few opium addicts.  545 
The other villagers, you know, one village might have one or two, but the other villagers would see 546 
what a rotten way that is to die and stayed off it except for medicinal purposes—you know, gout, or 547 
other people may have been on kind of a chronic bit, you know, smoking, but not to the point of 548 
real addiction.  But you know, we came up with the peeing in the bottle, the nanogram.  You know, 549 
you had to pass that before you go.  And lots of people did not like that program.  And—well, OK, 550 
but that's the rule.  You know, it's your choice.  I had one good Yao friend, you know, former, I 551 
don't know, captain, (*** Wun Chien).  You know, a captain ended up in the Yao program was more 552 
like a colonel in the Long Tieng program.  And this is up at Ban Houei Sai and Nam Yu.  And he—I 553 
don't know if he had a stomach ulcer or what, but for years he could never pass, you know, the 554 
nanogram.  And our policy again, at the time, was even if the wife and kids wanted to go onto the 555 
U.S., we were pretty hardnosed.  We did not split families.  So, no, you've got to wait.  You've got to 556 
wait.  And it wasn't until, I don't know, '86, maybe or so, when [Wun Chien] finally passed the 557 
nanogram, the peeing in the bottle thing and they may—I don't know if he faked and had somebody 558 
else pee, [Interviewer laughs]  but he went to Seattle and I was happy, you know, to see him and his 559 
family get out of here.  Nice family, but … 560 
 561 
(35:14) Were there proposals made by representatives of the various clans on what the 562 
United States should do for the Hmong besides just sending them off to the United States 563 
or someplace else? 564 
None that I ever really got into.  I was never a real strong proponent for U.S. resettlement of the 565 
Lao or the Hmong or the Yao or the other highlanders.  My more concern was, say, first asylum, 566 
that people who fled Laos for decent reasons should be allowed a first asylum in Thailand.  And 567 
then the ideal situation in my feeling for the bulk of the people—Lao—whatever ethnic group—was 568 
that resettlement in Thailand was really the best solution—you know, common language, no snow 569 
like Minneapolis, whatever.  And—but to ensure first asylum in Thailand, a certain number of 570 
people had to leave—to leave Thailand.  You know, keep the Thai government, their embassy, their 571 
ministry of interior happy.  To allow an influx of the 5,000, you know, 1,000 had to leave, you know, 572 
sort of showing the flag.  So—and this is a particular—I put a problem in quotation marks in the 573 
Hmong camps and the camps up like in Nan province with the Yao, the Mien refugees—is that we'd 574 
announce that JVA is going to go up and do a prescreening.  OK.  So 3,000 people, counting the 575 
wives and kids and everything, would come up for the prescreening.  And they were getting in the 576 
process, OK?  Then a few months later with all the files and computerized files and folders, another 577 
team would go up with INS—a JVA team with INS.  And out of those 3,000, maybe 2,000 would 578 
show up for INS.  And the bulk of those people would all be passed by INS, approved for U.S. 579 
immigration.  OK.  And then they'd get their medicals and get sponsors in the U.S. and a month, 580 
you know, two months later the buses would show up and only 1,000 would get on the buses!  And 581 
we've got lots of our American people and the Thai are really upset.  And on the American side, 582 
‘Oh, look at all this wasted money, the wasted resources we've blown, you know, for only one-third 583 
of the people that came up for prescreening have gone.  And my attitude was ‘We are not running a 584 
forced U.S. resettlement program.  If somebody wants to go, fine, they can go.  But I'm not going to 585 
go up there and, you know, dynamite them out of their hootches, you know, to get on the bloody 586 
bus.  And if they're not ready to go right now, that's OK.  So, they'll be around later—if there's a 587 
continual program.  And … 588 
 589 
(38:16) What were some of—I'm sure there must have been kind of unofficial 590 
responsibilities that came with the job of being a resettlement worker or a refugee worker.  I 591 
mean, obviously, you're doing interviews and you're counseling people.  But what kinds of 592 
other things did you have to do to keep yourself and the people you work with sane? 593 
Well, we had our JVA, you know, the contract staff—Joint Voluntary Agency—which for Thailand 594 
was NGO—the International Rescue Committee, which I still hold in a very, very high regard. 595 
Do you know Jim Anderson, by the way? 596 
Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.  And Liz, his wife, yeah. 597 
He's in St. Paul as you must know. 598 
Right.  Well, say hello to him when you get back. 599 
Well, in fact, I'm going to interview Liz and her sister when I get back.  So … 600 
Which sister—Sue? 601 
Patricia. 602 
Oh, the younger one.  OK.  Yeah, Sue is another good—the older sister, you might want to … 603 
Well, I might get all three.  I'm not sure. 604 
Yeah. 605 
 606 
(39:09) So, anyway, I'm sorry.  You were talking about IRC and what else type of things you 607 
were doing. 608 
Yeah, the—we had the JVA side, which were pre-screeners and processors.  You know, those 609 
decision-making things.  And above them, before them, we had our—what we call our EAOs—610 
ethnic affairs officers.  And those were our U.S. government officers, which—it was Jerry and John 611 
Tucker and at different times we had one or two other people in that job and also maybe for the 612 
Vietnamese and for Cambodians.  And for—from '75 on to at least about '81—'80 maybe or '81—613 
our EAOs were kind of the decision makers.  We—and then myself, after we got reorganized in the 614 
refugee program starting about '79, I was kind of the boss of the EAOs.  We split our—Lionel split 615 
the program up into the Cambodian-Khmer Affairs that were at the border of Cambodia, and then 616 
the refugee processing side, which was kind of my side, the deputy for refugee program, and EAOs 617 
under me.  And the EAOs would select which cases were going to be presented to INS.  And for 618 
the most part, they interviewed every family in the camps to, some extent, verify their stories.  It 619 
varied at different times, at some times early one, when we had these point systems and severe cut 620 
lines as to who we could process, somebody claimed to be a colonel and he turned out to be a 621 
samlor driver—you know, he didn't make it.  But we took the tack that lying to us was not lying to 622 
INS, which is a reject type thing for immigration, you know, 212 A19 of the Act.  But we [Pauses] 623 
you know, problem cases and if they got referred to me sometimes for decisions, yea or nay, you 624 
know, very rarely for an up country interview.  Jerry could do that much better on the Hmong and 625 
some of the other ethnics and he put an awful lot of study into particularly the other ethnic groups 626 
because he had never really worked in the other areas in Laos.  And John Tucker spoke Lao or still 627 
speaks Lao better than I do.  I still do pretty well at it.  But, anyway, I'd end up with sometimes 628 
stacks of files on my desk and—you know, for yea or nay or reject.  And—but … 629 
 630 
(41:50) I don't know that much about John Tucker.  What was his background coming into 631 
this? 632 
He was Peace Corps in Thailand—1970, up at Khon Kaen, northeast Thailand.  And then he hired 633 
on with USAID and was in with several other guys in the Vietnamese training center back in 634 
Virginia in Arlington.  He was going to study Vietnamese when, I guess, USAID saw the 635 
handwriting on the wall and decided not to hire a bunch of people—you know, for Vietnam.  And 636 
Tucker, since he already had northeastern ties from the Peace Corps, you know, quite similar to 637 
Laos, he switched over to USAID Laos and came and worked in Savannakhet and Pak Se in 638 
southern Laos.  And that's where I met him.  I never worked with him at all.  But he was evacuated 639 
out of Savannakhet in [Pauses] from May—early May '75, mid-May '75 to Udorn and then back to 640 
the States.  And then all the Vietnamese showed up, so he ended up working in Guam for a month 641 
or two.  And then, when the program got started in Udorn, he showed up in Udorn in September—642 
I'm thinking September of '75. 643 
 644 
(43:06) OK.  Did you have to deal with any Hmong who were sneaking across, trying to go 645 
back to Laos and fight and then sneak back again and … 646 
Well [Pauses] By ‘deal with them’—I don't know what your—I knew—I knew several and several, 647 
you know, quite a few Lao that were doing the same thing.  And it was sometimes kind of a joke in 648 
Nong Khai camp and Ban Vinai and the other parts where they had Lao refugees like at Nakhon 649 
Phanom where, you know, they'd come back to the Thai side, you know, turn their guns into the 650 
Thai army security people, come back and visit their families in the camp and sometimes pick up a 651 
bag or ten bags of rice or whatever—that and pick up their guns from the Thai army people and 652 
then back to Laos.  So, I was—well, not so much deliberately.  It was not my job, so I just sort of 653 
stayed out of that program and later, when we got involved, to some extent with the POW-MIA 654 
business, I contacted those people a little bit more often, you know, looking for information and 655 
false information.[Chuckles]  And then, later after August '78, when the yellow rain thing came up, I 656 
was in more contact with them, looking for that smoking gun.  And … 657 
 658 
(44:30)  Did you ever find anything close to [a smoking gun] or … 659 
No one ever did.  No, we kept asking the guys, ‘Hey, come on.’  You know, the Commie Lao are no 660 
better secret keepers, I think, in general than the old Royal Lao army were—people were—Lao 661 
government people were.  So, there's got to be a hand grenade, a rocket, an artillery shell.  Even if an 662 
artillery shell weighs 40 pounds, you can pull just the head out of it or the guts out of it and bring it 663 
out in a bag.  And CIA put money into that search.  The State Department put money into it, a 664 
consulate up in Udorn.  DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency—had a lieutenant colonel working on it 665 
quite extensively for '82, '83, anyway, traveling around, spoke Thai.  And as far as I knew, absolutely 666 
zero came out of that except, you know, Matt, was it Meselson's bee shit theory [that “yellow rain,” a 667 
chemical agent that the communists allegedly sprayed over the Hmong in the jungle was really 668 
massive amounts of feces from Asian bees]  and I interviewed with Meselson, the Harvard 669 
biochemist whatever.  I interviewed with him back in '85 or '86, back in Virginia.  And I got a letter 670 
from him, I don't know, six months ago.  He said he was coming out with another paper on it and 671 
haven't got it as yet, but … 672 
Interesting. 673 
Yeah, they—Lionel and I and another guy—we did what may be the first official U.S. government 674 
reports on the yellow rain and that was in August of '78.  Jerry was up in Nong Khai and he set up 675 
several interviews for us and Lionel and I and this other guy, we took the train up to Nong Khai and 676 
spent the day interviewing Hmong with interpreters about what they'd seen, what they experienced,  677 
and came back to Bangkok and Lionel wrote a two-page cable about, you know, yellow rain.  A few 678 
months later, Reagan's in, Al Haig's in, you know, the great anti-Communists are in government.  679 
You know, so we're really down on Russia and the yellow rain.  Well, OK.  That was the policy at 680 
the time. 681 
 682 
(46:45) Mike Carroll said I was supposed to ask you if you knew anything about a plan to 683 
turn Ban Vinai into kind of a Hmong—a permanent Hmong enclave, a Hmong village.  He 684 
said something like 71 square miles of land were supposed to be set aside to make that area 685 
permanently Hmong.  Do you know anything about that? 686 
No, I don't. 687 
OK. 688 
It would have made sense that somebody might have been thinking about it, but one of the 689 
problems we had—problems on one side, benefit on the other side, is when somebody asked what 690 
is the Thai government policy for Hmong or for Indochinese refugees, say,  ‘Well you've got to 691 
specify which part of the Thai government.’  You know, administrative interior has one.  The police 692 
have another.  The Thai army on one side may have some.  The Thai army intel on another side will 693 
have a different policy.  The Thai NSC will have a different policy.  And they're not talking to each 694 
other.  So … 695 
Well, supposedly, Jerry Daniels was all hot and bothered because the Hmong had been 696 
guaranteed that and it didn't come through and so, anyway, he said ask you about it, so 697 
there, I asked. 698 
Yeah, right.  No, it may have just been an idea that was floated.  You know, hey, this is a good idea.  699 
Let's do it.  But then somebody else in the government said, ‘No, no.  We don't want them here.’  700 
Just like they're saying now.  We don't want them here. 701 
 702 
[The two take a break and re-convene shortly thereafter.  New track begins] 703 
 704 
Mac Thompson 5 705 
 706 
(0:01) When did you meet Xuwicha? 707 
That would have been with Jerry or via Jerry in probably, I don't know, early 1980s. 708 
Oh, OK.  So … 709 
Late ‘, early ‘80s. 710 
They shouldn't make the front of this thing so doggone small.  So, between the time that 711 
you—when you left—it would have been '76, '77? 712 
Yeah, I left November of '76 and came back in—back to the refugee program in August '77, but 713 
two months down in Kuala Lumpur to help get that program started.  And then, in November or 714 
December of '77 here back in Thailand. 715 
Was there—I mean, I realized there was sort of a greater influx of Hmong, but were there 716 
any other specific reasons why you think Lionel basically said to you, ‘OK.  I don't care 717 
about your career.  I don't care about your prospects.  Get your butt up here’? 718 
Well, we worked well together.  In '76—Lionel came back in January of '76, you know, for this real 719 
push on the refugee program.  That's when kind of the JVA concept for Thailand got started.  He 720 
went to IOM, which is International Organization for Migration.  State Department money grants to 721 
IOM to hire American staff.  And he just hired a whole bunch of Peace Corps—people that just got 722 
out of the Peace Corps because they had language, said, ‘OK.  Now, you're working for me.  You're 723 
going to be working here in the refugee camps in Thailand interviewing.’  And he sent two of them 724 
up to Udorn to work with us.  And Lionel and I were in—well, Lionel in Bangkok with one other 725 
guy and Jerry and John Tucker and I up in Udorn.  And you've not met Lionel as yet, but 726 
[Thompson’s cell phone rings, Interviewer pauses recorder] Hold on.  I must not have my name 727 
programmed into his phone because he said, ‘Who's this?’ 728 
Oh, well, then. 729 
But at least he's returning the call.  Anyway … 730 
OK, you were … 731 
… with Lionel.  Lionel showed up, you know, Jerry and John and I are up in Udorn and, of course, 732 
by then we're experts on refugees, INS matters and all this other stuff.  And Lionel is—it can be 733 
kind of a ‘blow them out of the water’ battleship-type thing when he approaches problems.  And 734 
usually he's right and usually he wins.  And he came out with all sorts of strange—to us up in 735 
Udorn—to me up in Udorn—ways to implement the program and things to do and some of them 736 
we implemented, like the point system, when it got developed.  And some of them, he said, ‘Hey, 737 
we've got too much going on up here, you know, covering for Ubon and Nakhon Phanom and 738 
Udorn and then Jerry up north also.  We just …’ 739 
 740 
(3:00)  I'm sorry.  Give me just a second here.  My microphone has drooped on me, so I'm 741 
going to point it back where it needs to be. 742 
All right. 743 
OK.  Now it's just behaving badly. 744 
OK.  Need a stiffer collar. 745 
I guess.  Well, you know what?  We'll just make do.  All right.  Sorry. 746 
Anyway, some of the things he directed.  Said, we just can't handle this, so we'll ignore it. 747 
So, what were some of Lionel’s ideas that didn't pass muster?  I'm not trying to make Lionel 748 
look bad.  I'm just curious. 749 
No, no.  Well, I don't really specifically remember.  But, you know, timelines to do some things, 750 
numbers to get things done, deadlines.  You know, it just won't work, you know, for our program 751 
up in Udorn.  And it may work in Bangkok.  We had John, Jerry and I and two former Peace Corps, 752 
Patty Culpepper and Sally Maxwell, I think.  And covering a pretty good sized territory.  And we did 753 
something right because out of that 10,000 some hundred-odd numbers, you know, for that May-754 
June '76 program, we had something like 7,500 of them out of our office.  You know, the INS 755 
approval.  So, something worked anyway.  And I've told Lionel, in later years, that if I had worked in 756 
Bangkok for him, I probably would have quit and gone back to work for USAID.  [Interviewer 757 
laughs]  But when I got back to Washington, Lionel—that was in '76, Lionel was back in 758 
Washington and was this through spring of '77, then again in '78.  Once a week, Lionel's—I 759 
forget—I think he was in Chinese language at the time, but once a week I'd drive over to Lionel's 760 
house in DC—I lived in Alexandria—and we'd get on the phone and we would call John Tucker in 761 
Bangkok to see what's going on.  And we'd split the cost.  You know, Lionel's a concerned 762 
individual, willing to do things—do what he thinks is right.  And we'd get information because the 763 
embassy did not really want to report on the refugee situation in Thailand and Tucker was not really 764 
allowed to send out the sit rep—situation reports at all.  Anyway, we'd get it on the phone and then 765 
Lionel would start, you know, lobbying around with Julia Taft and Congress and the State 766 
Department, you know, and all these other folks.  And as I said, you know, blowing people out of 767 
the water when they objected to what things he was proposing.  So later in '78, when he phones ‘Get 768 
you ass back out to Bangkok,’ I said, ‘Well, why not?’  [Interviewer laughs]  It may not be career 769 
enhancing, but it worked out quite well for me.  I mean, in spite of USAID, if you will, but … 770 
Considering you like Singha, you like Thai women, I think it worked out just fine.  [Both 771 
laugh]   772 
Right.  So like I said, you know, Lionel, we're still very, very good friends and I'd probably go work 773 
for him again on some program.  Some things I wouldn't just because I've retired now and I've got a 774 
family here.  But—too busy, but … 775 
 776 
(6:07) Obviously, there must have been a tension between your work as kind of an advocate 777 
for refugees who, at least in some cases, would choose to resettle somewhere else and INS 778 
people. 779 
Ooh.  Now, are we taping?  I guess, yeah, I guess we have to. 780 
You just—well, you can edit out for public consumption anything you want. 781 
OK.  Good.  Yeah, in general and not on some specific people, but in general, the INS people I 782 
worked with were a bunch of cretins, Neanderthals.  And some of them just too—some—many—783 
they were too glorified in their authority, you know, in approving and rejecting people to go to the 784 
U.S.  And they, well, I mentioned earlier when we had our—up until about '80 or '81 when we had 785 
our EAO system going—well, we always had the EAO system.  But Jerry and John and I probably 786 
rejected more people than INS did.  We rejected or selected not to present to INS at this time 787 
because of, you know, the cut line in the quota system or different ethnic groups or whatever, you 788 
know, trying to make a balance in the program between Yao and Hmong and Lao Theung and Akha 789 
and Vietnamese and Cambodians.  And later, INS got in a—well, 1980—the Refugee Act of 1980 790 
passed, which—probably it would have been '81—Joe Surek was the INS director in Hong Kong at 791 
the time.  And things got a whole lot tighter and then INS decided they were in charge.  And the 792 
State Department did not have the authority to select which refugee applicants got to see INS.  And 793 
I was still kind of the deputy for immigration side down here in Bangkok.  But the EAOs—and at 794 
that time, we had a lot more numbers, so the EAOs were in a position of being less selective or not 795 
even having to select who got to see INS.  But I guess, kind of a loss in authority at that time on our 796 
side, but still, many of the INS people were, you know, sitting there just happy—happily rejecting 797 
people—and God, I—it still bothers the shit out of me.  [Chuckles] 798 
Oh, I'm sure.  I'm sure.  I suppose they imagined themselves to be the gatekeepers for 799 
American citizenship. 800 
Many of them, as opposed to, say, hey, these—whatever may be additions, you know, better than 801 
some of the illegals we have in the U.S.  They're coming in legally. 802 
 803 
(8:58) At what point—this is something I should remember because I talked to Dennis 804 
Grace and I know he mentioned this, but at what point was there discussion of trying to get 805 
some kind of official dialogue with Laos to discuss resettlement of those who may have 806 
wanted to resettle or … 807 
You mean, voluntary repatriation? 808 
Right. 809 
Oh, I don't even remember.  That may well have come after—I left in August '83.  And I know after 810 
that Dennis went up with, you know, a couple meetings in Laos—Luang Prabang, particularly, I 811 
think where he met his current wife.  You know, where the UNHCR, you know, what triparteid 812 
meeting, you know, UN, Lao government and Thai government meeting.  But … 813 
OK.  So, that was after your tenure there. 814 
I think so, yeah. 815 
 816 
(9:50) OK.  So, let's see.  '78, Refugee Act of '80.  Were there significant changes that sort of 817 
took place in the refugee camps over that period that made life for people in them easier or 818 
worse or was it more of a static situation which people just had to either qualify or make a 819 
decision about whether to stay or go? 820 
Well, things got better in the camps and such with massive funding coming into UNHCR and more 821 
NGO presence in the camps, whether it's hospitals and public health services, schools, English 822 
teaching, French teaching.  Still not particularly pleasant places to live, but maybe I got a little bit 823 
jaded in seeing too many refugee camps.  But like when I was up at Huai Nam Khao, just sort of—it 824 
was described to me earlier by people that had been there—you know, hovels alongside the railroad.  825 
And we were driving into it and they're—they were indeed fairly—it would seem to me fairly nice 826 
hovels on the side of the road—not wooden buildings, but, bamboo shacks with blue plastic 827 
sheeting, keep the rain off and the—I said, ‘Well, OK, I've sort of spent nights in places like this up 828 
in Laos in the old days.  You know, it's livable, not really nice, but it's OK.  And when they get into 829 
this new stalag thing, it will be nicer, but restricted.  You won't be able to get out. [Chuckles]  Now, 830 
changes in the camps, just internal camp politics.  I'm thinking like on the Hmong side, like the Ban 831 
Vinai.  You know, lots of heartburn when different camps closed.  When Ban Vinai closed and 832 
when the camps in Nan province closed and when Nong Khai, it will be a residual move to the Nam 833 
Pong camp up in Nakhon Phanom province.  And I'll send you or scan and e-mail to you the camp 834 
stats—statistics for all those years.  Or maybe I'll snail mail them to you.  It would be just as easy.  835 
But … 836 
 837 
(12:07) Is there a site somewhere that has a map with all the Lima sites on it?  That's one 838 
thing I've never really been able to … 839 
That's one of the ones I sent you today. 840 
Oh, wonderful. 841 
There's a friend—the Thai-Lao-Cambodia Brotherhood Group.  And back in 1998—the group just 842 
started in '98.  That's when Les Strouse and I signed on with it.  And this guy, Jim Henthorn, whom 843 
we had met, but we met on e-mail, he started a—his project map scan and … 844 
Oh, yeah.  You were telling me about that. 845 
Yeah, the 1:250,000 maps for Thailand—or for Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and, say, eastern Thailand 846 
where the, you know, the airbases were.  And he ran out of maps.  And so, I sent him all of my 847 
maps, which were, you know, were a pretty complete collection and Les sent him his.  So Jim 848 
finished his scan project.  And so some of the maps on Laos, anyway, still have—and a few on 849 
Thailand, have my writing on them still because they were the old operational maps from those days.  850 
[Interviewer laughs]  Anyway, that one, when you open up a map of a particular area and then it's 851 
broken into—you scan it—each map is about yea size.  Scan it in eight sections.  So you can click on 852 
one section and then that blows up and then, of course, you can go plus, plus, plus and get down to 853 
it.  So they’re a hell of a lot easier to read than the originals.  Plus Jim went through and—for Laos, 854 
not so much for Thailand—put down our—almost all of the Lima sites.  And … 855 
Excellent. 856 
So that goes along with you've got the Air America site books for Laos.  Do you have those? 857 
No, I'll have to get them. 858 
Yeah, you can—Back in 1988, I think it was or early '89, when I was in Khartoum.  One of the good 859 
books services—Dalley Book Service—George Dalley was a USAID for a couple years up in 860 
Paksane in Laos, '62, '64.  And then, you know, left the foreign service, but amongst—he was 861 
working for a living, but also had a book service out of his basement on southeast Asia, particularly 862 
Laos.  And I loaned him my site books from Laos back in '88, '89 and he got them copied in the 863 
same, you know, flip format.  Another 12 bucks or $17.00 or something or other.  But at least 864 
they're there.  And then he's still selling off his website.  You can Google—d-a-l-l-e-y—Dalley Book 865 
Service, you know, it will pop up.  And … 866 
 867 
(14:47) Were there many internal Hmong political problems that you or other staff had to 868 
intervene in, in the camps? 869 
[Pauses]  Well, not me.  And I'm really not aware of others.  Jerry—well, the great boiling pot of 870 
Hmong was, particularly Ban Vinai, as opposed to the northern camps, you know, up in Nan 871 
province.  Two camps in Nan—Nam Mieu and Maejarim [or Sobtuang].  And there were lots of 872 
politics in, you know, the Ban Vinai camp, which I'm not really very familiar with.  You know, the 873 
Chao Fa movement, which is still going on and other people like my friend Lee Lao, who got pissed 874 
off and took his group out. 875 
 876 
(15:35) Well, go ahead and tell that story because you told it this morning, but of course, it 877 
wasn't on the record.  So … 878 
Which one? 879 
Lee Lao. 880 
Oh, yeah.  Yeah, Lee Lao just—one of the kind of unfortunates, in some ways, who missed the 881 
resettlement boat.  He was—I had worked with him in the spring of '69 when I—out working on 882 
Sam Thong.  And Li Lau was the commander as a captain up at Houei Tong Ko or way up north of 883 
the PDJ, Lima Site 184.  And good guy.  You know, not a real strong military commander, but he 884 
was the—kind of the leader of the Sam Neua Catholic Hmong.  You know, not a real large group.  885 
But anyway, he was in Ban Vinai—or in Namphong and I think he was part of the groups that got 886 
flown out down at Namphong.  And then up at Ban Vinai.  And I'd see him on occasion, but he—887 
along toward 1979 or '80, he took about 500 of his people out of the camp—out of Ban Vinai, up 888 
to—I think it was Udorn province to kind of locally resettle and work with the Thai army on anti-889 
Communist projects.  And sometimes I think they got in fighting with the PL up in the Lao border 890 
in Saraburi province.  And here about two years or three years ago, kind of out—well, I left in 891 
August '83, a couple days before I left, he must have got the word that I was departing.  Because he 892 
bopped into my office here in Bangkok to say good-bye.  So, OK.  And then the next time I heard 893 
from him was two or three years ago—like 2003—a phone call.  He tracked me down and 894 
probably—maybe through relatives in the U.S. or something.  But anyway, we had lunch a couple 895 
times and now he wants to go to the U.S.—well, with his wife and kids.  And he's got a couple kids 896 
in the U.S. already.  And say, ‘Hey, there's no refugee program.  You have to go on the normal 897 
immigration.  You know, one of your sons has to file an I-130 petition for immigration.  And I just 898 
don't know if that's been done or not.  I kind of suspect it has not been done.  But… 899 
 900 
(17:52) Maybe it's just an outsider's perspective, although I think I heard both Dennis and 901 
Jim [Anderson] talk about this.  But there seemed to be a real reticence on a significant 902 
number of the Hmong's part to not want to go to the United States and to really want to go 903 
back to Laos.  Did you pick up on that? 904 
Oh, yeah.  But back to Laos under what circumstances? 905 
Oh, for sure.  Sure. 906 
And I talked with—Jim, you know, worked for IRC in Seattle for quite a few years.  And [there 907 
were] no direct flights from Asia to Portland at that time, so I'd bop into Seattle.  And a couple 908 
times, Jim would come out by the airport and we'd BS a little bit.  And I talked with some of the 909 
Hmong there in Seattle and, of course, in Portland.  And a lot of the older people.  And I talked to 910 
ethnic Lao, too, that I know in Portland and in San Diego.  And they’d say, ‘Yeah, we want to go to 911 
Laos.’  Well, I said, ‘Well, yeah.  But you're the 50 year-old.  You and your wife are.  And you've 912 
been in the States for six years now, something like that.  And can your kids give up Big Macs?  Can 913 
your wife give up her washing machine?  You know, can your four-year-old who was born here, give 914 
up what—the cartoons or whatever on TV?  Can they learn how to squat to take a shit again?  Yeah, 915 
you'd be happier back, but not them necessarily.  And a lot of it was tied up to the resistance, 916 
whether it was the ethnic Lao folks or the Hmong and the Yao—Lao Theung were heavy in the 917 
resistance up in outer Ban Houei Sai area.  But yeah, you know, dreams to return.  How about the 918 
Cubans down in Florida? 919 
How's that working out? 920 
Right.  Or the Hungarians. 921 
So, what … 922 
Oh, and then also, you know, the thing absent, you know, voluntary repatriation to a new Laos or an 923 
old Laos.  The longer, again, part of my viewpoint, the longer they stayed in Thailand maybe the 924 
better for them because maybe the Thai government would open up a local resettlement program.  925 
They never did.  And they may never will.  I say may never will, you know, not not never will—926 
double negative there, but if there's let's say, just Hmong in Thailand—there are 6,500 up at Hui 927 
Nam Kau in Petchabun province.  And who knows how many more in Northern Thailand, you 928 
know, sort of self-resettled.  You know, 20,000, 30,000?  How—untold number of ethnic Lao in 929 
northeastern Thailand and just sort of melded in.  Yao, Yumian refugees or migrants from Laos, you 930 
know, not refugees from Laos necessarily, in northern Thailand.  Never hear anything about them. 931 
 932 
(20:50) So what ultimately took you out of this line of work in 1983? 933 
Well, it was decided that I had been here long enough. 934 
By whom? 935 
Well, we were on State Department detail.  Actually, it came up kind of as a result of the Cambodian 936 
situation down at Kamput camp on the Cambodian border.  Fall of 1982—summer and fall of '82—937 
the INS down on the Cambodian camps were just going wild with an 80%, 90% rejection rate.  And 938 
their viewpoint, which had a viewpoint of sorts—we didn't happen to agree with it.  But they said, 939 
‘Hey, the Cambodians fled Pol Pot.  Right?  OK.’  And December '78, January '79, the Vietnamese 940 
invaded Cambodia and basically knocked Pol Pot off the map.  You know, he and 400,000 refugees 941 
are up on the Thai border.  OK.  Just east of Bangkok three hours.  OK.  So these people left—fled 942 
Pol Pot.  They were refugees.  But now Pol Pot's out of power, they can go back to Cambodia.  943 
So—you know, extremely high rejection rate.  And you've not talked to Mike Highland as yet, but 944 
anyway, Mike—as the—he had replaced Lionel in June of '81 as the refugee coordinator.  And 945 
anyway, Mike sent me down to Kamput.  He said, ‘Try to keep the lid on things.’  And talk to Jim 946 
Anderson.  He was down there then.  Keep JVA and INS—or JV—keep JVA from killing INS.  947 
Extremely high tension factor down there.  I was down there for about seven weeks and I lost a 948 
little over 20 pounds.  And it was not a—that was the most difficult working situation I've had in my 949 
life.  But out of that, you know, sort of sandbagging INS, if you will.  I'd call back to Mike and Mike 950 
would call back to a buddy of his back to the NSC, and out of that came NSDD93—early in '83.  951 
From the U.S. National Security Council—NSDD—National Security Decision Directive, signed by 952 
Ronny Reagan—by him, not by a machine—to the head of agencies—you know, State Department, 953 
justice—which includes immigration—and several others basically to say, ‘I hear there's a problem 954 
with Cambodians in Thailand.  What is this problem going on?  It doesn't sound good, so please 955 
straighten it out and report back.’  That may have been late '82 when it came out.  And it's—yeah, it 956 
would have been late '82.  But that's only the 93rd for that whole year.  So, it got everybody's 957 
attention.  And yeah, it would have been late '82 because Mike was leaving in August '83 anyway.  I 958 
was going to extend for a year from my normal departure time in August '83 to August '84.  And 959 
right—just before Christmas time, our State Department refugee program bureau boss was here and 960 
he said, ‘Well, you know, Mike is leaving on schedule.  You'll leave on schedule, too.  Extension 961 
curtailed.’  But at least three of the INS guys that were here were given something like two weeks to 962 
choose their next post.  And the district—or the OIC—officer in charge—was allowed to finish his 963 
tour, I think. And they moved—and a very good plus, they moved the district directorship from 964 
Hong Kong to Bangkok because this is where most of the immigration action in the whole region 965 
was going on.  A guy named John Schroeder, who turned out to be a very, very good guy.  I mean, 966 
he was one of the pluses to the program.  So, not all INS are Neanderthals, definitely, but—so 967 
anyway, Mike and I felt somewhat vindicated in that the INS guys were sort of semi-tossed out and 968 
we were allowed to finish our normal tours.  And I must say, after, you know, seven out of the 969 
previous eight years, it was just kind of a—almost a relief.  You know, a fairly high-tension job.  You 970 
know, an intense job for seven years. 971 
 972 
(25:31) I would imagine that you'd spent a decent amount of time doing work that 973 
determines the fate of scores of human beings on a weekly basis.  That's got to take its toll. 974 
Yeah, well, it did.  And you know, I was adding up that the State Department, well, the U.S. 975 
government who were getting, what—six hours in annual leave, you know, per pay period, 26 hours 976 
for 26 days a month.  Twenty days a month—whatever that comes out to be at that time.  And 977 
during the refugee program—and that's also on a use or lose.  You got your annual leave ceiling, 978 
which for foreign service is 360 hours, which is a whole bunch of days.  But anyway, during that 979 
period, I lost something like 600 hours just because things were busy.  Well, it was not really 980 
appropriate to take off for a week or two weeks. 981 
 982 
(26:31) Yeah.  [Pauses]  Well, are you hungry? 983 
[The two make plans for lunch, recorder is turned off] 984 
 985 
 986 
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(0:01) So, you were about to tell the story about how Xieng Khouangville had just been 989 
recaptured in '69. 990 
Yeah, May of '69, when I was working over at USAID out of Sam Thong and, oh, the—it was 991 
mostly the Hmong and some of the Lao Theung who took it back.  They had been working out of 992 
Padong, Site 5.  And up … 993 
This doggone thing.  I'm going to just put it over here and be done with it.  OK.  Sorry. 994 
Yeah, they had been working out of Padong, Site 5 and, oh, for quite awhile.  Anyway shelling the 995 
place from, oh, Site 19 area, a kind of mountain ridge between five and Xieng Khouang.  They had a 996 
105 Howitzer up there.  And they recaptured the place in the morning and I had been—I guess, in 997 
Sam Thong, probably.  We got the word on it.  So, you know, jump in one of our Porters and we 998 
flew over and—to the runway east of the town.  And Her Tou, and I then—my Hmong naikong.  999 
And I went over there and we were—got a ride downtown and such as the town is.  And there were 1000 
all sorts of civilians around and it seemed to be a kilometer or two kilometers or a bit more from 1001 
town out to the airport.  And the families didn't know if they were going to be able to hold the place 1002 
or not.  So, decided to move the civilians out.  So, we had, oh, Hughies, the Sky folks had their 1003 
Hughies coming in with more troops and ammunition resupply and all that, coming into the soccer 1004 
field downtown.  And so we loaded up—on the back haul, we'd load them up with civilians and fly 1005 
them out to Padong Site 5.  And then, we had Porters—USAID and Sky Porters come and— 1006 
[Loud music starts blaring out of the restaurant speakers] 1007 
Wow, can't win.  Wow.  Turn it off for a minute. 1008 
 1009 
(0:04) Well, we had the Sky and USAID Porters, you know, coming into Site 5 were coming into the 1010 
airfield, Lima Z03.  But no people there to back haul.  So, Her Tou and I found a couple of trucks.  1011 
There was a Russian, [sounds like “Le Dusinam”, perhaps a French language reference to the “Deuce 1012 
and a Half”]-sized truck I drove.  It didn't have any brakes when I took that one.  And Her Tou 1013 
took the Russian-style jeep.  And so, we were, for an hour or a couple hours, we had people from 1014 
the soccer field starting walking out to the airfield so we could move people faster out of the airfield.  1015 
And then we started shuttling, you know, several loads of the truck in the Russian style jeep out to 1016 
the airfield so we could make use of the empty quarters.  And—but I've got a photo of us on the 1017 
jeeps and all that someplace in the archives.  And then, oh, the town itself, I've got some other 1018 
photos where—in a helicopter— 1019 
[Food arrives] 1020 
Whoa, that was quick.  Well, maybe we'd better turn it off and I'll …  1021 
 1022 
[Recorder turned off, the two eat their lunch.  New track begins] 1023 
 1024 
 1025 
(0:01) Now, I don't know where you want to start, but we were in the middle of that story 1026 
about … 1027 
Right.   Middle of Xieng Khouangille and Her Tou and I had—we were shuttling civilians from 1028 
downtown—out from the downtown soccer field out to the airport for—so the Porters could 1029 
shuttle them on down to Padong, Site 5.  And at the same time, helicopters, the Hughies, were 1030 
picking them up downtown and running them out to, oh, the—directly on down to Site 5.  And I've 1031 
got some photos from the airport.  They had—the friendlies, the SGU had drug up, I think it was 1032 
three or four of 37-millimeters anti-aircraft guns and they were all lined up and I got photos of 1033 
those.  And down at the—or just off the airfield.  And one thing I'd like to go back.  We were 1034 
talking about caves in northeastern Laos a bit.  But right close to the airport, there was also called 1035 
the hospital cave.  And when they—some of the guys—some of the SGU troops told me when they 1036 
got into the place and inside the—I've got some photos of the outside of the cave.  But they had 1037 
gone in and the hospital cave had a parachute over, you know, kind of the operating room table and 1038 
there were some of the metal bowls, you know, doctors use during operations still had soggy 1039 
bandages in it.  You know, they had taken over so quickly.  And I had—when I—in the evening, 1040 
when I got back to Sam Thong, I radioed down to Vientiane to Dr. Pat McCreedy, you know, Dr. 1041 
Weldon's wife.  And she came up the next day and we took her back out to the hospital cave.  And 1042 
we had a couple flashlights.  We wandered around a bit with just stacks and stacks of medicine, you 1043 
know, going back in the cave.  And we don't know how far away because we only had one flashlight 1044 
each.  And you know, the rules say have at least three sources of light when you're underground.  1045 
But we talked to a couple of the troops that had—were walking out here.  They just wandered 1046 
around back further in the cave and said it went back a hell of a long way.  Well, I don't know how 1047 
far a hell of a long way is, but Pat took samples of odds and ends of the medicines to take back and 1048 
here some of them were marked for the Iraqi Ministry of Health and just got diverted in the 1049 
shipment.  And that Russian truck that I had been driving the day before, the dashboard 1050 
information, you know, like the gear shift levers that, you know, designate this were in Spanish.  So, 1051 
it probably got diverted in a shipment also to Haiphong and ended up in Laos.  And—but, anyway, 1052 
one—I think the first or second day, I was flying around town in a Hughie and I've got some aerial 1053 
photos of the town.  And you know, between the 105 Howitzers and U.S. Air Force, it was just 1054 
rubble.  And I don't know if it's been rebuilt since then or not.  If you go along for tours in Laos you 1055 
see all these guest houses up on the PDJ and that, but I don't see any guest houses down in Muong 1056 
Khoun, in Xieng Khouangville.  And so there is a way—it's fairly close.  I know, 30, 40 kilometers 1057 
from the PDJ, so it’s easy to visit.  And the road’s supposed to be pretty good.  And—but it also—a 1058 
couple places between town and the airport where I stopped and I was looking at—well, the road 1059 
went through kind of a small cut bank area.  And on the vertical part of the cut, where the road had 1060 
been made, there was a—kind of a people-sized hole going back into the side hill a little bit.  And I 1061 
asked a couple of civilians what was that?  And they said, ‘Well go take a look.’  I didn't want to—1062 
snakes or whatever.  But they said, ‘Well, it goes in two or three feet and then turns into kind of like 1063 
a T.  So, if you're walking along and the airplanes come over to do some bombing, you scoot in 1064 
there, you know, for safety reasons.’  And anyway, I ended up with all these several, well, I don't 1065 
know if it was several thousand or several hundreds.  Quite a few hundreds anyway, of those 1066 
civilians down at Padong, in Site 5.  They didn't have any food, so, you know, radioed up for C-46, 1067 
you know, to come in for a rice drop for them, you know, for a day or two of food, anyway.  And at 1068 
the same time, the Sky and helicopters refueling there.  They also had a couple 123s coming over  1069 
dropping fuel and some—and dropping ammo.  And I don't remember what site it was.  It wasn't 1070 
there I think—maybe you could ask Les Strouse about it.  One of the Air America C-123 pilots had 1071 
a record, I think, for—kind of like they did in World War II or whatever—or the Vietnam War, too, 1072 
when you shot down an enemy airplane, you got a little star on your airplane.  This one Air America 1073 
123 pilot had two Air America H-34s painted on the cockpit of his 123.  He had dropped parachute 1074 
bundles into friendly helicopters.  [Laughs]  Whoops, right.   1075 
 1076 
(5:19)  A mark of shame. 1077 
But anyway, the others— Xieng Khouangville —that was that kind of spring and summer of '69 1078 
offensive by Vang Pao that I think kind of surprised everybody.  People weren't really expecting that 1079 
things would go so quickly and so well.  And quite—just a few days afterwards.  And again, I wasn't 1080 
keeping a diary in those days, unfortunately, but by late May, early June, they got into the, really, the 1081 
south end of the PDJ.  And I was—I forget where I was, but anyway, I had heard that the friendlies 1082 
were right on the south end.  So they took a helicopter up there—one of our USAID H-34s and 1083 
landed.  And again, there was a whole bunch of civilians around and the troops were kind of, you 1084 
know, wandering around.  You know, what are we doing here?  You know, there's no bad guys.  1085 
And we didn't know, again, what was going to happen.  So, we got a C-46—it was out of my ground 1086 
air radio to HD2 and heard a C-46 dropping in the area and talked to him and say, ‘Hey, come on 1087 
over to these coordinates, we need a drop here for holdover for the troops and for the civilians.’  1088 
And I can just sort of him—see him thinking and looking at his map and, you know, say, ‘Oops, 1089 
wait.  We haven't been on the PDJ for several years.  You know, who's buried in Grant's tomb?  1090 
What is your name?  Who's Babe Ruth?’  Anyway, he came over and dropped OK.  And then, oh, 1091 
that afternoon we were shuttling with the helicopters, shuttling civilians out to Site 72— Tha Tam 1092 
Bleung, the one Preecha had mentioned yesterday because the closest friendly place anyway.  And 1093 
that was the only time in my life I've ever fired an M-16.  It was almost—like the last load of the day 1094 
and sun going down and had the civilians loaded on the airplane.  And their pig jumped out of the 1095 
helicopter.  And you know, the husband and the wife jumped out of the helicopter, the kids still in 1096 
the chopper.  And they're going after the pig and getting dark and the pilot’s getting low on fuel and 1097 
we got to get back to Sam Thong and everything.  And I grabbed an M-16 from one of the troops 1098 
and zapped the pig.  It took a whole bunch to stop the little pig anyway and the owner of the pig all 1099 
kind of bent out of shape.  And I said, ‘Well, at least this way you can cut it up and maybe sell to all 1100 
the other civilians there to eat with their rice this evening.’  [Chuckles]  Well, I never shot an M-16 1101 
after that or not before. 1102 
 1103 
(8:07) So, it seems to me when we were talking the first time we got up to your transition 1104 
from IVS to USAID.  And I know that maybe we should focus on those specific periods you 1105 
talked about where you were working with the Hmong in Laos. 1106 
OK.  Well, they—I went over to USAID in—well, I finished IVS in June of '68 and prior to that I 1107 
had worked in—well, in Hongsa—had never specifically worked with the Hmong.  But in Hongsa, it 1108 
was largely a Lao ethnic group.  And in Nam Bac, that was more of a kind of a hot place and 1109 
everything.  And it was kind of restricted in travel.  And when I went, it was out with—you know, 1110 
we used the helicopter with some of the troops.  And just supplies out to an outlying school, 1111 
something of this sort, or some medical supplies, and no real time on the ground.  And those were 1112 
ethnic Lao and a couple villages were Tai Dam from the Diem Bien Phu area that we just stopped,  1113 
we settled in—north, in Nam Bac area, not even as far south as Luang Prabang or Vientiane.  There 1114 
were Hmong in the area, but they were some of the SGU troops had outlying paths to the north.  1115 
And so I wasn't working, really, with the Sky people at that time.  They had their units—the SGU 1116 
down at the east end of the Nam Bac runway and I was over on the west end where the Lao army 1117 
folks were.  And that—oh, Nam Bac, as I say, or about February through June when I left Nam 1118 
Bac—that was '67.  And the summer of '67, I don't remember what happened.  In the fall of '67, 1119 
along towards September, I got transferred to my favorite valley, which is Xieng Lom Valley, up in 1120 
northern—northwestern Sayabouri province.  It kind of borders on Thailand on the northern 1121 
Nan—way at northern Nan province.  And that valley was some Lao, but largely ethnic [Lu] people.  1122 
And Lao Theung were in and out and the Hmong were in and out, not living in the valley.  There 1123 
were a couple of Hmong, oh, airstrips—the one strip in—to the south of the Thai border.  And Nan 1124 
province, of course, and they were able to—they had quite a few Hmong.  But at least in Xieng 1125 
Lom, there were not too many of them.  That was through the end of '68 when Sky decided to turn 1126 
Xieng Lom into a training base and they moved in quite a few Thai.  And then, they built a Sky 1127 
compound, another small airstrip for porter or twin otters.  And the Sky folk moved in there and 1128 
that's when I moved out.  So that was—that was fall of '67 through December of '67 and I had also 1129 
been working in a place called Muong Met. 1130 
I left my camera at the restaurant, didn't I? 1131 
Oh, well, shut down and … 1132 
 1133 
[Recorder turned off, the two go retrieve the camera and come back.  New track begins.] 1134 
 1135 
 1136 
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 1138 
(0:00) All right.  Good.  Now that the camera's been recovered … 1139 
Yes, all is well. 1140 
The—fall of—late '67, December of '67 when I left Xieng Lom, the Sky folks were moving in there 1141 
making a training base.  And for a few months I had been working also a place called Muong Met, 1142 
east—through north—northwest of Vang Viang.  That had been recovered back in 1964 by the Lao 1143 
army, what they called the Triangle Operation, which is Muong Met, Muang Kasi and I think over to 1144 
Vang Viang also.  And covered in Conboy's book, Shadow War.  So, this was four years afterwards, 1145 
but still, the valley was interesting.  Again, didn't have much in the way of highlanders there except 1146 
coming into trade now and then.  Ethnic Lao valley.  But they were still, it seemed, mostly Pathet 1147 
Lao sympathizers.  And they—well, when I first went in there to work, another IVS guy had been in 1148 
there and had left.  He had started a five-room or a seven-room school that wasn't complete.  So, I 1149 
was in—sent in there to see about finishing up the school with the local villagers doing the work and 1150 
USAID supplying the cement and roofing tin and the like.  But I went in and as I kind of normally 1151 
do, go up to the local army commander and just ask—check the security.  And there was the town 1152 
and then the airstrip and the IVS house, a little two-story bamboo place right next to the airstrip.  1153 
And then, walk on up to the head of the airstrip and up a small hilltop is the local army camp.  You 1154 
know, maybe a platoon or—a large platoon or a small company ensconced there in their positions.  1155 
And just talking to the commander.  ‘How's the security situation around here?’  You know, just 1156 
normal things.  ‘Oh, no problem.  Hey, we're all OK.  No bad guys around at all.’  ‘Oh, fine.  Great.  1157 
Sounds good to me.’  And I had been there in Laos 18 months at that time already and said, ‘Well, 1158 
good.’  And I said, ‘I'll be down at the house.’  He said, ‘OK, and every evening about 1800, we'll 1159 
send a half a dozen troops down to sleep around the house on the ground or around.’  And I said, 1160 
‘Oh, the security's that good, huh?’  I said, ‘Well, I don't want to inconvenience your troops, so do 1161 
you have a spare bunk up here on the hill?’  So, I, during the time I was there, in and out, I'd usually 1162 
spend every week or two weeks at Muong Met and then, say, two to three weeks up at Xieng Lom 1163 
and fly down to Vientiane, you know, for a little R&R and then do the circuit again.  But I never did 1164 
spend the night in the local IVS house there. [Interviewer laughs]   They also had a village about two 1165 
or three kilometers away.  We were doing a small one-room school over there.  And it was a nice 1166 
village and it was known locally with the local Lao officials and the army as a good party village.  1167 
And if there was a particular wedding or something or other they wanted to go to, they would put 1168 
the word out two or three days ahead of time that they and I, if I wanted to go—and I did a few 1169 
times—were going to go over there and get drunk and spend the night in this village two, three 1170 
klicks away.  And the reason for putting the word out was so the villagers could tell their husbands, 1171 
their fathers, their elder brothers that, don't come home—you know, the guys that were still in the 1172 
PL army, don't come home because there might be problems.  And there was—the only time I was 1173 
ever there—when I was in Muong Met where there was a problem was when a couple of the new 1174 
Lao soldiers from the Vientiane area had been over there, staying in that village, stayed late, were 1175 
walking back to the army camp and they ran into a couple guys coming home for R&R and there 1176 
was a little shootout and one of the PL guys was killed.  And then there's apologies all over and hey, 1177 
these new guys didn't know the rules.  There was a—it was sometimes kind of a strange war.  1178 
Muong Met has a—the Lao army had a barber who was also kind of a village medic also.  But he 1179 
had been a PL soldier, had been recruited back in the early ‘60s, whatever, been sent up to Hanoi 1180 
for, supposedly, for some medic training.  Then he was in the Pathet Lao army as a medic.  And he 1181 
had been coming back to—sometime—I was up there in late '67 and early '68—so, sometime, I 1182 
guess, '66 or '67 he had been coming back to visit his family and he didn't know that the valley had 1183 
changed hands and he got captured.  [Interviewer chuckles]  But they did not turn him into the 1184 
Vientiane authorities because they needed a medic—local army did and he was also a barber.  But I 1185 
let him give me a haircut, but I didn't allow him to give me a shave. 1186 
No razor. 1187 
Yeah, the summer of '68—June of '68, I finished IVS and was job hunting that summer and then 1188 
August '68 over at our ACA—the American Community Association Club in Vientiane, which was 1189 
in the USAID compound and just having lunch and a couple beers with some of the USAID guys 1190 
from the USAID refugee office—refugee relief branch.  And I knew several of those guys pretty 1191 
well.  And one of them said, ‘Well, he's going on home leave and then, or training for a couple 1192 
months in France and he's going to be gone for four months.’  Why don't I take his job?  Well, fine.  1193 
I got nothing else to do.  And so, back over to the office—well, they said your first exercise is to 1194 
figure out how to fill out this form—USAID form to authorize hiring a person.  And if you can 1195 
figure that out, maybe you'll get hired. [Interviewer laughs]  So the salary I proposed for myself was 1196 
too high.  That got cut down, but I did that.  That was my introduction to the refugee program on 1197 
the logistics side of it.  You know, the C-46 rice drop program that another guy handled—Jack 1198 
Williamson did that and I did all the pots and pans and blankets and rice and salt, you know, the 1199 
requirements and movements upcountry.  Then, January '69, went up to Luang Prabang with Joe 1200 
Flipse for a few days—well, a few weeks—three or four weeks.  And I think it was February '69 is 1201 
when I moved over to Sam Thong to work with—for Pop Buell for an indefinite period.  And that's 1202 
when I got into more Hmong than anything else.  Hmong and Lao Theung, that's basically all that 1203 
was up there. 1204 
 1205 
(6:47) Well, what was your relationship like with Pop Buell?  Obviously, he's been described 1206 
by many people in many ways.  What's your take on the man? 1207 
Well, I don't know him half as well—a third or a tenth as well as people like Ernie Kuhn and Paul 1208 
White and Carol [Mills] and Tom Ward and other know him.  But I—one of the reasons I think 1209 
the—well, Joe Flipse was sort of my mentor for many years.  Yeah, he was up at Houei Sai at the 1210 
time.  And a guy named Bob Dakin was at Luang Prabang.  But he and his wife were on home leave.  1211 
And Joe was also working in Luang Prabang and he wanted me to come up to work at Luang 1212 
Prabang for a month or so, work for him to learn, to some extent, as Joe described it to me later, to 1213 
learn kind of Joe's way of doing business.  So, when I went over to Sam Thong, I would not be Pop-1214 
ized.  [Interviewer laughs]  P-o-p-i-z-e-d.  You know, everything with a grain of salt or whatever.  1215 
But Pop was a super great guy and everything, but there are other ways of doing business.  And I did 1216 
this—when I worked for him, I did business his way.  But he was very liberal on what he wanted 1217 
done.  Oh, up at Bouam Loung one time there was a whole bunch of military activity right near 1218 
Bouam Loung and Pop said, ‘Well, go up and evacuate the civilians, dependents and refugees from 1219 
Bouam Loung.’  OK.  We go up there to Porter and we got the USAID Porters and a couple of 1220 
helicopters and the Sky airplanes coming in and out and just get it done however you want to do it.  1221 
And there were—that's where I first kind of ran into kind of a Lao Theung-Hmong/Meo conflict is 1222 
that people [were] mobbing the airplanes.  So, I went up and talked to Cher Pao Moua, the 1223 
commander there, a super good guy, a strong guy.  And they said, ‘Hey, look.  I've got to separate 1224 
the ethnic groups down here on the runway.’ And he said, ‘OK.’  ‘And I need a couple troops to 1225 
help me do that.’  ‘OK.’  ‘And have them—Lao Theung on one side and Meo on the other side.  1226 
And every other airplane, you know, load them up.  And I need the troops with the guns to maintain 1227 
order.’  ‘OK.’  So it worked.  It was cooperative, but at least it quieted things down and … 1228 
 1229 
(9:14) Did you have any sense of what the nature of the conflict was between the Hmong 1230 
and the Lao Theung? 1231 
Well, the conflict was—well, not so much on—based on ethnicity or as were bad guys were around.  1232 
And at nighttime, this would have been probably March, April of '69.  There was a lot of military 1233 
right around.  And at nighttime, the civilians would have to filter off into the underbrush because 1234 
the bad guys were coming in and shooting up the positions all around Site 32 and they didn't want to 1235 
get killed.  So, when their airplanes show up to get out, I think there were somewhat more Hmong 1236 
than there were Lao Theung.  And they were just people who were trying to mob the airplanes.  And 1237 
the Lao Theung weren't getting their fair share of the evacuees, so that's why I did the separation. 1238 
 1239 
(10:10) We've talked several times now about how it's always the Hmong and not the Lao 1240 
Theung and how it's Air America and not Continental Air.  What would you like the 1241 
uninformed person such as myself, to know about the Lao Theung and maybe how they 1242 
compare with the Hmong? 1243 
Well, they—over the years, talking to some of the Sky guys and as you talk to more Sky guys and 1244 
talk to Ernie, particularly, you'll get a little different—well, maybe the same take on it.  But in the 1245 
earlier years, I think, the Meo army was primarily a Meo army and took heavy, heavy casualties.  And 1246 
they started getting more ethnic groups involved in the SGU program.  And the Lao Theung, by the 1247 
time—at least—and I was out of Sam Thong by this—well, Sam Thong was gone by this time.  I 1248 
was down at Vientiane.  But '71 or so, Redcoat, who is the case officer for Site 32 area, who said 1249 
there was fully 50% Lao Theung.  And you know, they were taking their heavy hits, too.  But it's 1250 
kind of—they very rarely ever get a mention into [?? – sounds like statches] as being participants in 1251 
the war, up in Military Region II.  Region I, you know, the Yao are the ones that, just being a 1252 
monster, killed a million of them in the southern Yunnan province and shed a couple hundred 1253 
thousand or whatever in Laos, but you know, they get more mention than the Lao Theung do.  But 1254 
the Lao Theung did some hard fighting up in the—out of site of Nam Yu, up in northwestern Laos.  1255 
And it's like Continental.  Air America is sexy, you know, CIA-owned, proprietary.  And, you know, 1256 
Bird & Sons started up as a bit of competition and then Continental bought them out in '65 and 1257 
right through '75, but hardly ever mentioned.  So, kind of a much smaller operation and, to a large 1258 
extent, a friendlier group of pilots to work with.  And they had fewer restrictions than Air America 1259 
did and no union.  As Les may mention, FEPA—Far Eastern Pilots Association—a union of Air 1260 
America pilots really screwed things up for a lot of Air America folks. 1261 
 1262 
(12:36) Yeah.  I think Heinie [Aderholt] talked about that a lot. 1263 
Yeah. 1264 
I think they're still working on trying to get retirement to some for some of these guys or 1265 
something. 1266 
Good.  But anyway, oh, I—Professor Bill Leary, doing his long book, which never got done before 1267 
he died, you know, I kept trying to say, ‘Well, tell Bill or ask Bill.  At least at the end, you know, 1268 
include a chapter on the other airlines and—but … 1269 
 1270 
(13:05) So, you were in Sam Thong for how long? 1271 
Just about February through June.  At—when we got down to the—earlier I was mentioning when 1272 
we got down to the southern end of the PDJ, when we had the rice drops in there and moving the 1273 
civilians out to Site 72.  And there was a grass runway there.  And they started bringing in Caribous, 1274 
you know, to resupply the food and the ammo and that.  This would have been like day two or day 1275 
three.  And one of the Caribous—I got some photos of it turning around.  And one of the gears 1276 
went off the hard pack of the runway and sunk three foot into the dirt.  And I left before they got it 1277 
out.  But we've got some pictures of the trench they dug and, you know, 100 troops with a rope 1278 
trying to help pull it out.  But right after that one I finished—that was on a USAID personal services 1279 
contract. And I left to go back to Portland and then back to DC to hire on as a direct hire with 1280 
USAID.  And when I came back in September of '69 and I forget exactly where I went the first 1281 
month, but anyway, shortly thereafter, I went up to Ban Houei Sai from about October '69 through 1282 
June of '70 when I got moved down to Vientiane. 1283 
 1284 
(14:31) So were your responsibilities in Sam Thong and Ban Houei Sai essentially the same, 1285 
providing … 1286 
Pretty well.  Oh, USAID—well, USAID refugee relief program in southern Laos—Takhet, 1287 
Savannakhet, Pakse—or Pakse, Savannakhet, we had people assigned there from a refugee relief 1288 
branch.  And they did refugee relief and resettlement, primarily resettlement.  In northern Laos, 1289 
Houei Sai, Luang Prabang and Sam Thong and later Sam Thong out of—Ban Soun after Sam 1290 
Thong was finished.  We were—USAID was doing the feeding for the SGU—the basic rice rations 1291 
for the SGU and all the paramilitary dependents.  So, we had—we were funded, probably, oh, 50% 1292 
or 60%.  I don't remember the exact percentages.  Say, 40% USAID budget and 60% CIA money 1293 
filtered through DOD that filtered down through USAID RO—requirements office—then over to 1294 
our office for procurement of rice and salt and pots and pans and blankets for the paramilitary 1295 
dependents.  So we—on our C-46 drop program, for example, we just had split rice contracts.  A 1296 
bag of rice would go—100 kilo of rice would go up to Luang Prabang and 40% of it was USAID 1297 
funded and 60% was the filtered funding.  And then, it went out to whomever, you know, the 1298 
dependents and the refugees and the paramilitary.  And for special combat rations or team rations, 1299 
the—Oh, CIA had their own—they did their own funding and procurement for those rations.  But 1300 
we had basic rice, canned meat, we—Dr. Weldon decided, on a public health basis, particularly in 1301 
northeastern Laos, Region II, that the refugees and dependents needed more animal protein.  So we 1302 
started the big canned meat procurement thing.  It started in Singapore and then procured down 1303 
there and then moved up to Bangkok and basically canned water buffalo.  And it got up to 1304 
something like 25,000 cases a month.  And it's expensive stuff, but it's what’s needed to keep people 1305 
alive, I guess.  That was one of my inventions.  When we first started getting the canned meat, we 1306 
were using helicopters to deliver it.  Helicopters are humongously expensive and USAID did not 1307 
have that much in the way of helicopters on contract.  Joe Flipse and I up at Luang Prabang, we 1308 
invented a parachute out of—we had PL-480 program, which provided for—from the U.S. 1309 
Department of Agriculture—food, wheat, cornmeal, wheat soya blend, bulgur wheat.  But they also 1310 
had large amounts of excess cloth that I guess U.S. manufacturers made.  It was sort of an 1311 
agricultural subsidy program.  And we got that stuff cheap and everybody needed cloth upcountry, 1312 
too, for making clothes.  You know, red and blue and black, you know, for the Hmong and black 1313 
and maybe other colors—when I left Laos, I left something like, I don't know, 100,000 square 1314 
meters of good quality denim in the warehouse, so the PL must have been selling jeans.  They've had 1315 
the Levis for years.  But Joe and I invented a parachute up in Luang Prabang.  So, you know, locally 1316 
made out of some of the cloth we had and just buy rope and use rocks and slipknots and tie 1317 
everything together.  And five cases of meat, drop it out of the door of a Porter and we were having 1318 
about 70%, 80% success rate with the parachute opening.  And if it didn't open, the cans on the 1319 
ground they could eat that day.  If they were both—and you just peel the metal out between your 1320 
teeth.  But still, that was—and we did that over Sam Thong a little bit, too.  And then, the meat 1321 
requirement—the delivery requirement went way up.  By '70, I was down in Vientiane then and we 1322 
invented what we called a hash.  For the C-46 program, we dropped, oh, 40 kilo of rice.  We 1323 
dropped 40 kilo salt and we also dropped—we ended up making noodles out of this PO-480 1324 
program as a rice substitute.  And then, to deliver the canned meat, I would just try different 1325 
combinations of kilos and cans of meat and different shapes of cans.  You know, come up with a 1326 
new shaped can, you know, from our Bangkok people.  Go out to the airport and we'd—you know, 1327 
the Air America people would bag it up for me and go out and we'd take a porter and just drop it on 1328 
the Vientiane runway.  Then run out and open up the bag to see what survived.  And we ended up 1329 
with one—or half a kilo—454 gram—you know, one pound, kind of a flat can—maybe six inches 1330 
diameter and inch-and-a-half thick that survived the drops better than anything else.  So we ended 1331 
up with maybe with eight cans of meat and 32 or 33 kilo of rice per drop.  So depending on the drop 1332 
zone, our people at Sam Thong or Luang Prabang and Ban Houei Sai was they all—you know, we 1333 
need, X number of bags of rice at this drop zone, X number of bags of noodles and X number of 1334 
bags of hash.  So, that was Les Strouse’s job for several years with Continental was dropping C-46 1335 
loads. 1336 
 1337 
(20:19) So, if I heard you right—and maybe I didn't—you said it was in Sam Thong where 1338 
you sort of had your big exposure to the Hmong. 1339 
Yeah. 1340 
At least lots of Hmong experience. 1341 
Oh, right.  Yeah.  For a relatively short period of time. 1342 
 1343 
(20:33) What do you think you picked up during that period of time about how they were 1344 
organized, maybe some of the cultural traits or the ways that they behaved towards each 1345 
other or towards you?  Just any stories or recollections about them from that period that you 1346 
can recall… 1347 
Not particularly, just because there was so much activity going on work-wise.  You know, work 1348 
three or four weeks straight through and then take off a few days down in Vientiane.  And I was 1349 
working, as I said, mostly the northern area.  Ernie Kuhn had gone on home leave and I had 1350 
replaced him on home leave.  There was a site—well, north of the PDJ, from Site 50, 32 and north 1351 
of there up to what was left of Sam Neua province at 184.  And then, for a period, I was working 1352 
around Xieng Khouangville and Site 5 and then down over southeast of the PDJ for a week one 1353 
time and never a day off unless you left town and you went down to Vientiane.  Now actually, I had 1354 
more—a hell of a lot more contact with the Hmong after I was down here on the refugee program.  1355 
Udorn for ten months in '75, '76 and then another seven years—or six years in Bangkok.  But you 1356 
know, traveling fairly often, say, with Jerry and others up to Namphong and then Ban Vinai and up 1357 
to the northern camps.  And I got to know more—several of the leaders fairly well, like Vue Mai, 1358 
Vang Neng and others, not half as well as people like Mike Carroll would have known who lived in 1359 
the camps.  But I—courageous people.  Lao Theung and others, too.  You know, humongous 1360 
hardships during the war and not necessarily real pleasant experiences in the refugee camps.  Plus I 1361 
still look at the Hmong that are up there at Huai Nam Khao now, you know, the 6,500.  Again, 1362 
what's going to happen to those folks?  And many of those have been there for several years now 1363 
and many of those would pull out their papers from Ban Vinai—you know, UN registrations when 1364 
they were in Ban Vinai in 1976.  You know, 30 years, 31 years in and out of the refugee camps and 1365 
they could have gone to the U.S. if they had just happened to be in Wat Tham Krabok in August 1366 
2003 when the Thai army did an inventory and a name list.  And for some reason the U.S. 1367 
government and the Thai just said, ‘OK.  Everybody who's on the name list is eligible.’  And if 1368 
families—and this happened quite often, when husband, wife—or father, mother and younger kids 1369 
are at Tham Krabok and the younger kids, you know, 20, 35 years old married and might have been 1370 
up country farming—a labor—contract labor services, and didn't make it on the list.  So, a lot of 1371 
these split families were just sort of created by that August 2003 list. 1372 
 1373 
(23:55) So, I think we started our sort of first big chunk in the last days of Vientiane.  So, 1374 
we'd better talk about your duty in Vientiane and … 1375 
Vientiane was June of '70 through June of '75, which was, to a large extent, a paperwork shuffle—a 1376 
juggling of things: determining the rice requirements we needed, talking with our people upcountry, 1377 
you know, how many refugees are we going to have and, for the first couple years, Jack Williamson 1378 
was my boss. 1379 
 1380 
(24:36) What, technically, was your job title in Vientiane? 1381 
Logistics—logistics management, something like that, and kind of the middle man between our 1382 
contracting office in Bangkok for commodities that were purchased in Thailand and our folks 1383 
upcountry who determined the individual needs for drop zones and for Sam Thong or for Ban 1384 
Houei Sai or Luang Prabang.  And then determining how to—well, simple logistics stuff, and how 1385 
to get stuff up to them, when to order the rice and pots and pans and blankets and salt and canned 1386 
meat, so it gets in the proper contracting sequence for competition—you know, two months, three 1387 
months for competition, and then delivery, and delivery into Vientiane.  On the rice side, we had a 1388 
very, very small warehouse down at Kilometer 4 in Vientiane, were we did all of our rebagging.  The 1389 
rice came in at 100 kilo rice and we had a rebagging contractor who turned it into 40 kilo, a triple 1390 
sack rice for an air drop.  And oh, that was—a phone call in the morning out to the Air America—1391 
ATOG—their Air Transport Operations Group.  How much rice and canned meat and hash and 1392 
salt and what do you have in the warehouse now?  OK.  And then, to the FIC—Air America Flight 1393 
Information Center—what did we drop yesterday?  If I can mark it off and, you know, what's it look 1394 
like for today and then check my lists.  And then, OK, a phone call down to the rice warehouse.  1395 
OK, tell the people in Thailand to bring in 50 tons of rice or to bring in 300 tons of rice.  Our 1396 
warehouse—it had to be turned over, basically, daily.  Coordinate the cars. [Thompson’s cell phone 1397 
rings, recorder is paused] 1398 
Oh, yes. 1399 
Yeah.  Are we back online? 1400 
We are back online. 1401 
OK.  That was turning over the goodies in the warehouse on a daily basis on a pretty highly 1402 
fluctuating thing.  That was just part of the juggling to make sure that the airport did not run out of 1403 
what they should have.  Empty airplanes don't make any money for anybody.  You're wasting time, 1404 
especially in the rainy season when you have windows to get up to certain drop zones.  There were 1405 
quite a few of them.  Pots and pans and blankets—steel bars.  We used to buy steel bars in Thailand, 1406 
which were fairly soft, oh, say, what—a quarter—a quarter or three-eighths inch thick at about an 1407 
inch-and-a-half, two inches wide and maybe two feet long—18 inches long.  And to send those up 1408 
country for the refugees and they can pound out the style of knife they want for themselves, you 1409 
know, for cutting brush and the like.  And USAID at one time had always said—and that makes 1410 
sense—‘Buy American.  Buy American.’  So, they said—I was getting hit, you know, buy U.S.  Don't 1411 
buy—spend all this money in Thailand.  OK.  So, we ordered in, I don't know, a ton of steel bars 1412 
from the U.S. from GSA and they—I guess I wasn't specific enough in the spec because some of the 1413 
poor refugees who got them up there are probably still shaking.  When they heated that steel bar and 1414 
whanged it with a hammer and the hammer rebounds and their arm is vibrating and—so, we went 1415 
back to the relatively soft steel and easy to sharpen parts from the States—or from Bangkok.  1416 
Plywood—we used to get all of our plywood for the C-46 rice drop program from Thailand.  And 1417 
… 1418 
 1419 
(28:17) Now why do you need plywood to drop rice? 1420 
The C-46s and the K-123s that we used—the pallets held—the old-style pallets held 13 bags of rice 1421 
and a bag of salt at roughly 100 pounds a piece.  That's 1,300 pounds per pallet.  But it's on a 1422 
track—rollered tracks in the airplane and leading up to the door.  And you drop, say, two pallets on 1423 
the old style and then the plane would come back around and drop two more pallets—so, six or 1424 
seven passes.  And the plywood was sort of the interface between the rollers and the rice bags 1425 
strapped—tied onto the pallets.  And the pallet went out the door with the load at that time and, you 1426 
know, the people on the ground could use the pallets for making houses or whatever else—furniture 1427 
or whatever else they wanted.  Again, ‘Buy U.S.’  So, you know, I ordered up a whole bunch of U.S. 1428 
plywood and they loaded it up out at the airport with 1,200 pounds of rice and they couldn't move it 1429 
on the tracks.  It was Douglas fir or pine plywood and it was just too soft. And the wheels from the 1430 
track just ate into the plywood.  So that was the end of that project.  But the Air America admin guy, 1431 
a former 123 pilot—yeah, a 123 pilot—copilot—Jerry McPherson.  He never got proper credit for 1432 
his bright idea.  He and a Philippine parachute rigger there—worked Air America, Ramon De Mesa, 1433 
came up with an idea of using what we call—end up calling a tilt trap.  And they called me about it.  1434 
‘Come up and take a look at what we're working on’ and ‘Hey, it looks good to me.’  With my 1435 
support, very little credit on this.  You know, ‘Keep working on it.  I think it looks good.’  They 1436 
developed a system where we ended up going to a larger pallet, but when it hit the door, it stopped, 1437 
the track tilted forward and the—at that time, probably about 20 or 25 bags of rice slid off the pallet, 1438 
you know, under the left horizontal stabilizer of the airplane.  And the pilot pulled—dropped back 1439 
into the airplane, the kickers pulled it off.  So, we went for using a—I have to check the numbers, 1440 
but went for using like 2,000 or 3,000 pallets a month to using ten pallets a month.  And the cost 1441 
difference was significant, plus the logistics when they had to have pallet contracts and steel roller 1442 
pallets contracts and rope contracts, you know, to have all these pallets for the old style drop system 1443 
in place at the right time.  A very simple thing.  And Pop Buell chewed me out on that one time.  1444 
Again, this would have been 1972 or so.  He said, ‘Hey, what are people going to be using for tables 1445 
and roofs and everything up country?’  ‘Well, Pop, what could I say?  They've had all this free 1446 
plywood for ten years already.  Maybe they saved some of it.’  [Interviewer laughs]  That's the only 1447 
real complaint I got out of it, but McPherson—he's not on e-mail.  I've been thinking of writing up 1448 
something, anyway, and get him to fill in the details and send it into the Air America quarterly log so 1449 




(31:52) Did you have any time in the midst of all this busyness and logistical planning to sort 1454 
of get a sense of how the war was going between '70 and '73? 1455 
Well, the sense, yes, in that we also—well, I did the C-46 drop schedule.  So as places were lost, they 1456 
dropped off the schedule.  And as people moved, they—a drop zone might have five drops a month 1457 
and suddenly it's up to ten drops and 15 drops a month.  Well, that's more people.  And I only have 1458 
one copy of a drop schedule.  It was May of '69, I think it was.  October of '69.  And I notice one 1459 
place in it had something like—I was just skimming through it the other day.  I sent it off to Texas 1460 
Tech, the Vietnam archives, but I made a copy of it.  And one place that was taken—it was way the 1461 
hell up on the rice drops and I don't remember particularly why.  I think it was Site 271 [Hat Khon], 1462 
which was southwest of Site 50, Phu Khum.  But—and I don't remember specifically any hard 1463 
battles that would have moved people down there.  But I—want to ask around about.  Ernie would 1464 
probably know.  Well, actually Ernie wouldn't.  He was up at Houei Sai by then.  But … 1465 
 1466 
(33:18) So, from—I mean, '73 comes, the ceasefire, but your job doesn't really change that 1467 
much, does it?  You're still feeding people and … 1468 
Well, it changed markedly.   1469 
Oh, OK. 1470 
One reason being that USAID had built a road from Route 13, from [Hui Promone] up to Ban Soun 1471 
and then the road was continued one up at Long Cheng.  And Ban—Sam Thong had gone down 1472 
the tubes in March of 1970 and the USAID operations moved down to Ban Soun 272.  Though 1473 
the—many of the drop zones along that area came off the C-46 list and we started sending things up 1474 
by truck—food items up by truck.  Also, with the ceasefire, there were much less movement of 1475 
people around, so there were in a more stable situation.  They were able to plant rice.  And to 1476 
harvest their own rice rather than getting kicked out of home and letting the PL come in and harvest 1477 
it.  So, things—oh, and then we started dropping airplanes—C-46s off the contract.  We didn't need 1478 
20 drops a day, you know, 500 drops a month—down to 400, 300 drops a month.  And then, Air 1479 
America left in summer of '73 and we're down to Continental 46s.  And I think they may have had 1480 
five 46s at one time but went down to just one or two, and then even dropped those.  And there 1481 
was—I think the last drops we had was one Papa Bravo Whiskey or Victor, was a—supposedly a 1482 
Royal Air Lao C-46 given by the U.S. government.  And I don't remember the date on the last 1483 
USAID paid for rice drop, but probably 1974.  So things slowed down.  It was sort of less fun. 1484 
 1485 
(35:20) What was the sense from your office and your area about how the political situation 1486 
was developing once the provisional government was established? 1487 
[Chuckles]  The PGNU—the Provisional Government of National Union.  I was low on the totem 1488 
pole.  I didn't think much about it.  You know, I did see one big—kind of big mistake that, I think, 1489 
we, the U.S. government had made was no provision for demobilizing soldiers from both the Lao 1490 
army and the SGU.  One of the things that was mandated by the U.S., was that the SGU would 1491 
be—to some extent, would be melded into the FAR—the Forces Armee Royale.  But it also meant 1492 
that large numbers of troops on both sides were demo’d.  And that young guys, maybe with—well, 1493 
not so young—30 years old and a soldier for ten years and got a wife and a couple kids and he hasn't 1494 
been home for many years and there's no rice paddy for him to work.  What is he going to do?  And 1495 
we had no demo [demobilization] program to speak of.  And we didn't fund one on the USAID 1496 
side, and the CIA didn't either.  It was something that we should have and banditry went up.  You 1497 
know, just thievery went up, which was understandable, but—and kind of acrimony, of course, on 1498 
the side of the former troops.  Personally, I didn't get into this very much, but I remember—well, 1499 
your guy Fue Her her, his father Her Chai and I used to talk about that when Her Chai would come 1500 
into the office looking for rice for VP's house and for the house in Vientiane, where they had people 1501 
coming down from—well, Ban Soun at that time or Long Cheng.  And ‘Well, we need some more.  1502 
We've got extra troops here.  You know, they're hungry.  Former troops.’  They'll get an 1503 
authorization and we can do this. 1504 
 1505 
(37:33) So, the news—I'm sorry.  Please, go ahead. 1506 
I was going to say that back to—on the geopolitical side, again, I was low on the totem pole and I 1507 
guess pretty naïve about the whole thing.  But USAID was looking at—maybe in the embassy, too 1508 
kind of upbeat that the ceasefire, the peace, the PGNU would hold.  And then, of course, Cambodia 1509 
and Saigon down the tubes and things started falling apart.  But I'd been in—with USAID in 1510 
Vientiane—or in Laos at that time from summer of '69 to summer of '75—OK, six years.  That was 1511 
overly long.  And for the—a little longer term future, USAID was planning on opening up another 1512 
liaison office down in Thailand here at the Port of U Taphao, a large industrial port.  And I was sort 1513 
of tagged and moved down there, south of Pattaya would have been great, you know, down on the 1514 
beach, you know, to possibly run that office or be number two in that logistics office.  They were 1515 
planning on bringing in cement and things for more reconstruction in Laos.  So another thing I’ll 1516 
fault the PL on.  You know, they screwed me out of that job.  [Both laugh]  Everything went down 1517 
the tubes.  But I remember one day in June of '75, when we were moving— I was moving 1518 
household furniture.  When we'd go into a house, I was working with a PL police captain who was a 1519 
very nice guy.  And there were usually two or three of either the USAID protestors or the leftist 1520 
student lawyers were with us.  And we had two trucks—two USAID trucks.  Or maybe one was—it 1521 
might have been a Lao army truck.  We had some Pathet Lao army coolies, and I had a USAID 1522 
truck.  And we'd—I'd bust into a house and we had an inventory of the rental contract—and on the 1523 
rental contract, it would show what was provided by the owner of the house and what was provided 1524 
by USAID.  And anything that wasn't on that list would belong to the individual house owners.  So 1525 
maybe we'd had three air conditioners—one provided by the owner of the house that stayed there.  1526 
The other two air conditioners that were provided by USAID.  That would go on the PL truck 1527 
because that belonged to the government.  According to the leftist lawyers and students—the PL 1528 
captain didn't care.  But if they had two refrigerators—one on the USAID list and the other not 1529 
listed, well, obviously, the not listed one was the personal property of the American who lived there.  1530 
The PL captain supported me—no, no, that goes on my truck to go out to the warehouse for 1531 
shipping down to Thailand.  And that was sort of my daily job for several weeks.  And one day 1532 
we're—you know, hot day, we're just having some cokes, taking a break, waiting for the trucks to 1533 
come back and a couple leftist lawyers were pulling my chain and said, ‘Hey, how much money do 1534 
you think you people or USAID is leaving here in Thailand?’  We said, well—we had heard this at a 1535 
staff meeting.  You know, $100 million worth of warehouses and vehicles and heavy equipment and 1536 
PL 480 food in the warehouse out at Kilometer 9.  It's hard to say.  $100 million, something like 1537 
that.  And they said, ‘Oh, boy.  Don't you feel pretty bad about that?’  And we said, ‘Well, a little bit.  1538 
But we look at the bright side of it.’  ‘Well, what's the bright side?’  We said, ‘Well, you know what 1539 
the USAID budget was for next year?’  Well, the guy didn't know.  I said, ‘It was $65 million for 1540 
Laos.’  ‘Oh, great.  Hey, that sounds good—$65 million.’  ‘Well, how much of it do you think you're 1541 




(41:34) Now, maybe it was—someone suggested that General Vang Pao and some of the 1546 
other higher ranking generals were essentially forced out of the country so that the United 1547 
States could get these USAID people back that had been taken hostage. 1548 
No, no. 1549 
Have you heard anything about that? 1550 
No.  Vang Pao left on May 14 and the USAID compound—office compound—in [***?] Vientiane 1551 
and the housing compound out of Kilometer 6 did not get invested and surrounded and taken over 1552 
until May 23 about.  So no connection with VP and his people at all. 1553 
That's what I thought, but … 1554 
Yeah, none whatsoever. 1555 
I just sit and listen. 1556 
And on the Lao government side, leadership side—the FAR military leadership side, they left on 1557 
their own at different times—either in May and June and I don't know if anybody left in April.  But 1558 
others left later in the year.  I can't see any connection at all because there's no organized exodus of 1559 
the FAR generals and the like. 1560 
 1561 
(42:44) Well I think we've come full circle and caught up with the first part of our interview.  1562 
But let's talk a little bit about the here and now and some of the issues that interest and 1563 
occupy your time now. 1564 
Well, I'm 100% retired.  I retired in January of 1992.  That's quite—15 years now, yeah.  And I did 1565 
work for 22 months in Moscow between '94 and '96 on USAID contracts.  But since '96, I've had no 1566 
gainful employment.  I haven't looked for any.  But then still been involved unofficially in refugee 1567 
issues and it's come more often that the Hmong are the problem than the other ethic groups that are 1568 
in Thailand.  I think the other ethic groups and probably the bulk of the Hmong are just seemingly 1569 
integrated into Thai society already and lay low and aren't making problems. 1570 
 1571 
(43:44) What would you describe as some of the reasons for the continuing problems with 1572 
the Hmong non-integration in Thailand? 1573 
Well, you say non-immigration, we're talking … 1574 
Integration. 1575 
If there's 30,000 Lao-Hmong in Thailand, there's only, what, 22% of them are up at Wat Tham 1576 
Krabok.  The rest are seemingly disappeared into the woodwork in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai and 1577 
Nan and Mae Hong Son provinces, the other provinces.  So, you've got 25% less than that at Huai 1578 
Nam Khao in Petchabun.  Many of those people will say at least 5,000 of them were either Wat 1579 
Tham Krabok residents or were former residents of different—one or more UNHCR sponsored 1580 
camps.  You know, go back all the way to 1975—who missed the boat on U.S. resettlement.  And 1581 
who for, to a large extent in the last several years, would like to go to the U.S. now.  You've got the 1582 
Wat Tham Krabok population estimated at one time back in, say, 2000, 2001, 2002, to be up to 1583 
20,000 or 25,000 or so, but people coming or going, out working as contract labor.  You're moving 1584 
up to Nan province for a year or more and then maybe coming back for parties with the family, 1585 
marriages and the like.  But when the Thai army took the inventory on August 2003, there were 1586 
15,000 there.  So, there's at least ten or more thousand absent.  And many of those are ones who are 1587 
at Wat Tham Krabok.  And of the 15,000, who were on the inventory list, there were also people in 1588 
Wat Tham Krabok at that time who declined to be listed at that time, but they were, ‘Hey, this is 1589 
another Thai army trick.  They're going to get a name list and photos and then they're going to send 1590 
us back to Laos.’  So they were legitimately there, but not on the list, so they were ineligible for U.S. 1591 
resettlement per the rules that were set by state and by the Thai.  And then, out of the 15,000, there 1592 
were others that declined to go to the U.S. and ones that were even INS approved, after that 1593 
declined to go.  And just a real mish-mash.  Part of that—after August 2003, there were the phone 1594 
calls from Thailand and the phone calls from the U.S. to Laos, to the jungle people, but also to 1595 
Vientiane and Luang Prabang and the KM 52 and said, ‘Hey, you all come now.  This is your 1596 
opportunity.’  And that's roughly, say, 1,500 of the people that are in Nam Khao, some of whom, if 1597 
they got hit with a decent UNHCR refugee qualification interview and one by the U.S. government, 1598 
too many of those people would flunk it.  And many of those people could go back to Laos without 1599 
any real problems.  But it's kind of questionable to me if somebody had been out since 1975, and 1600 
even if they were, well, 15 or 10 years old when they came out, they're 40-some now and how they 1601 
would do back on Laos, whether the Lao government would even acquiesce to having them back.  1602 
Since they've been out so long, there might be an argument made of presumption of refugee status 1603 
because of the long-term presence in Thailand in a first asylum country.  And then, there's the jungle 1604 
people who've legitimately come out in the last several months—six months and more—who are, I 1605 
think, without a doubt, legitimate refugees, who are not—some in Wat Tham Krabok, many not in 1606 
Wat Tham Krabok, like the 152 at Nong Khai.  And then there's the people still in Laos who, 1607 
against the Lao government, would finally allow UN, UNHCR or ICRC or almost anybody to do 1608 
some monitoring and resettlement program, the jungle people would probably, largely come out, 1609 
too.  The impression I get talking to some of the foreigners, the Americans that have been up there 1610 
and talked with them and, you know, kind of getting away from the rhetoric of [Chuckling]—and 1611 
the bleeding heart side is that, you know, they're not a real resistance movement.  They're more of a 1612 
defensive posture and they want to be either left alone or, if they could be guaranteed a safety thing, 1613 
‘Hey, come out of the woods.  It's nice they're living in a village complex.’ 1614 
 1615 
(48:56) So, do you see any hope of some kind of constructive addressing of this refugee 1616 
situation or do you think it's—we're in it for the long haul? 1617 
Well, as opposed to forced repatriation, I'd prefer the long haul. 1618 
Yes.  Quite true.  Quite true.  1619 
And at least for now, I don't see the U.S. government moving back on the State Department side.  1620 
It's not so much an embassy problem here, an embassy problem in Vientiane on the U.S. side.  It's 1621 
State Department side and attitude problems in RP—Refugee Program Bureau.  And ‘Hey, all these 1622 
folks, they're not refugees.’  So, I guess if it gets to a point of forced repatriation, then we're getting 1623 
back to what I was talking about yesterday, a first asylum case and first asylum is important.  But it 1624 
takes more than me retired out in Bangkok to turn the State Department around.  [Both chuckle] 1625 
 1626 
(49:58) Yeah, especially post-9-11, I'm sure.   I mean, that's complicated matters 1627 
considerably. 1628 
Well, the bureaus—the State Department bureaus have their responsibilities and I—OK, they're 1629 
taking 9,500 [Karen], I think, this fiscal year off the Burmese border and I don't—I've not looked 1630 
into, researched at all what association the Karen had with the U.S. government, you know, since 1631 
World War II.  Well, World War II they did, OK, with the OSS and that and the British.  But since 1632 
then, was there any particular association?  You know, they've been in Thailand—refugees in 1633 
Thailand for 20 years, 30 years.  It's a real problem for the Thai, problem for the refugees up there 1634 
on the border.  But why are 9,000—and I don't want to sound too much sour grapes here, but why 1635 
are 9,500 Karen qualified for the U.S. refugee program when several thousand at Huai Nam Khao—1636 
many of whom did have a direct U.S. association with the SGU, were not qualified?  The one reason 1637 
is Thai and, I guess, probably state, too, are worried about the pull factor, the magnet factor.  More 1638 
go to the U.S., more will come out of Laos.  Well, if anything new comes out of Laos, if they're a 1639 
Hmong shopkeeper in Vientiane, send them back.  And if they're jungle people, take them to 1640 
Wisconsin or take them to the Twin Cities. 1641 
 1642 
(51:33) All right.  Well, it's probably getting close to time for you to … 1643 
All right.  Well … 1644 
… take off and … 1645 
Oh, yeah.  I've got Lee Pao … 1646 
 1647 
[Mr. Thompson is going to visit a Hmong man imprisoned in Thailand.  Interviewer expresses his 1648 
thanks, interview is over]  1649 
 1650 
